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ABSTRACT 
The three main non-traditional schools of environmental philosophy - social 
ecology, feminism and deep ecology - contain divergent views of and claims regarding 
the uni versalization of their particular world views. One example of this divergence of 
views concerns the status of human/non-human relationships. Like many other 
contemporary non-traditional liberation movements and theories, these three 
environmental movements and schools of thought have been influenced by the theories of 
Karl Marx. 
Therefore, in order to clarify and understand the way in which, and the extent to 
which, key proponents of each of these environmental movements and philosophies 
universalize their particular philosophic world views, this thesis compares their theories 
to those of Karl Marx. Emphasis is placed on Marx's critique of abstract and idealist-
based universalizing as applied in the area of human-non-human relationships, as this 
critique and area of application is a key feature of non-traditional environmental thought. 
Also, the methodology used in this thesis is a critical analysis of the primary philosophic 
texts and related commentaries. 
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PREFACE 
Ecological philosophy may be defined as a subject area within philosophy that 
focuses on "relations to nature" and studies "problem[s] at the vast juncture between the 
two well-recognised disciplines"' of ecology and philosophy. Among philosophers 
writing about this new' topic in philosophy, those engaged in radical eco-politics' can be 
identified by their commonly held views that I) non-human nature is integrated with the 
physical, conscious and human social experience of reality; and 2) the interactive, 
concrete relations between human and non-human nature (human/nature4) are at the 
foundation of philosophic investigation. These two views, however, are not unique to 
politically radical, ecological philosophers. The ideas that I) non-human nature is 
directly linked to humanity's physical, conscious and social experiences; and 2) dynamic 
and concrete human/nature relationships serve as the basis of philosophy, were presented 
in the early writings of Karl Marx. 
This paper attempts to clarify the indebtedness of politically radical ecological philo-
sophy to Marx's philosophy, with regard to the above points"!)" and "2)." This study 
examines positions of one representative philosopher within each of the three main 
ecopolitical groups: Murray Bookchin, whose thought is aligned with that of 
Naess, Ame, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, translated by Rothenberg, David, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 36. 
2 The term "ecology" gained widespread acceptance as a topic of philosophy in the late 
1960's and early 1970's, as evidenced by its appearance in the "Subject Index" of the 
Philosopher 's Index 1970. 
3 Philosophers engaged in radical politics on the basis of their ecological outlook can 
be divided into three main groups: "social ecology, deep ecology, and ecological 
feminism." Plumwood, Val, "The Ecopolitics Debate and the Politics of Nature," 
Ecological Feminism, Edited by Warren, Karen J. (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 65. 
4 The term "human/nature" shall be used throughout this paper to replace the lengthier 
phrase, "human and non-human nature." 
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social ecology; Karen Warren, who emerges from the ecofeminist movement; and Ame 
Naess, who founded the philosophical view called 'deep ecology'. 
Chapter 1 explores Marx 's view of the human/nature relationship, illustrating that his 
interpretation of"naturalism or humanism"' serves as the foundation of his approach to 
the field of philosophy. Emphasis is placed on relevant discussions in The Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and The German Ideology. Marx 's version of 
"naturalism or humanism," founded on a new understanding of human/nature relations, 
reverberates throughout the philosophies ofBookchin, Warren and Naess. Chapters 2, 3 
and 4 focus on key aspects of their works, aspects that rely on and expand on Marx 's 
understanding of human/nature relations as a) a dynamic, concrete relationship between 
non-human nature and human consciousness; and b) the basis for "realistic" philosophy, 
which holds "that material objects exist externally to us and independently of our sense 
experience.''6 
Marx, Karl "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Collected Works 3, 
(New York: 1ntemational Publishers, 1975) p. 336. 
6 Realism opposes "idealism, which holds that no such material objects or external 
realities exist apart from our knowledge or consciousness of them, the whole universe 
thus being dependent on the mind or in some sense mental." Hirst, R . J. , "Realism," 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7, Edwards, Paul, Ed. , (NY: Macmillan Publishing 
Co., 1nc., 1972), p. 77. Independent existence, however, does not preclude relationality : 
recognition of the independent existence of material objects requires a conscious 
observer. This view, articulated by Marx in his critique of idealism, emerged as ''New 
Realism." New Realists argue that "even if it is true that whenever something is being 
perceived, it is an object for a mind, it does not follow that it has no existence except by 
being perceived. Hence, the idealist commits a fallacy if he concludes that the whole 
world is nothing but ideas from the truism that when something is known, it is an object 
for a mind." Ramsperger, A. G., "Critical Realism," Vol. 2, p. 261 . 
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CHAPTER 1: MARX'S VIEW OF HUMAN/NATURE RELATIONS 
This chapter examines Marx's concept of human/nature relations, in which human 
and non-human nature are understood as unified dimensions within the dialectical 
process' of human activity {labor). In light of the dialectic, Marx 's concept of the 
human/nature relationship is best understood as a unity that develops in three historical 
steps, culminating in the emergence of communism as the human "society" which fully 
expresses the human potential embedded in the unity of "man and nature." In the first 
step, humanity is, for Marx, merely the human species in a pre-historical and pre-theoretic 
conscious state of development. In the second step, humanity is man - conscious, 
historical being that perceives itself as other from nature through the activity of labor. In 
the third and final step (which, Bookchin argues, never comes to fruition), humanity is 
fu lly human, historically developed to the point of realizing humanity's potential and 
recognizing nature as the self-expression of human society in the world.' In what 
follows, the triadic relations are discussed in order to demonstrate Marx's understanding 
of human/nature relations. First, what Marx means by humanity and nature is clarified, 
since humanity as "man" and "woman" doesn ' t occur until the second stage of the 
dialectic. 
Marx uses the term 'dialectic' is a restricted sense. Marx does not use the dialectic to 
explain anything other than human affairs. Marx applies the dialectic as the principle of 
change through the systematic unification of two opposing aspects to understand the 
human causes of various historical, social movements. See Hook, Sidney, From Hegel to 
Marx, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 72-76. 
' Bookchin modifies Marx's homocentric view of nature by 1) acknowledging "natural 
diversity" as an "end in itself;" and 2) by reversing Marx 's understanding of the direction 
of change: "human consciousness and management [is] nature rendered self-conscious 
and self-active." See Bookchin, Murray, ''Toward an Ecological Society," Toward and 
Ecological Society, (Montreal: Balck Rose Books, 1980), p. 59. 
2 
Marx declares that his approach to philosophy is a synthesis ("unifying truth") of the 
extremes of idealism and materialism. This approach, that of a "consistent naturalism or 
humanism," is the "only" correct approach to philosophy. 
Here we see how consistent naturalism or humanism is distinct 
from both idealism and materialism, and constitutes at the same 
time the unifying truth of both. We see also how only naturalism 
is capable of comprehending the action of world history.9 
Marx 's particular humanism or naturalism represents a new approach to philosophy, one 
that emerged from the modem European tradition. Humanism in Europe, since the latter 
part of the fourteenth century, expresses the attempt begun by Renaissance thinkers to 
"reintegrate man into the world of nature and history and to interpret him in this 
perspective."10 It exalts both the "soul" and the "body." Naturalism, within this historical 
context of humanism, is the "conviction that man is part of nature - that nature is his 
realm, that the features which tie him to nature {his body, his needs, his sensations) are 
essential to him to the point that he cannot abstract from them or ignore them."" 
What is meant by Marx's use of the terms "naturalism or humanism?" His language 
indicates that he understands "naturalism" as a challenge to Hegelian philosophy's claim 
to comprehend "the action of world history." Marx's position contrasts with that of most 
19th century German philosophers, who either viewed the world as primarily a function 
of an eternal, active universal spirit (as idealists) or as a function of a mechanistic nature 
which operated without autonomous deviation and according to fixed laws or principles 
Marx, Karl, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Collected Works 3, 
(New York: International Pub li shers, 1975) p. 336. 
'
0 Abbagnano, Nicola, trans. by Langiulli, Nino, "Humanism," Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Vol. 4, Op. Cit., pp. 69-70. 
II Ibid., p. 70. 
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(as materialists) ." Marx ' s philosophy, while materialist as such, represents a different 
kind of philosophy'', one that is based on human beings in a natural-historical context. It 
combines the activity of human consciousness with nature so that neither are understood 
apart from a dynamic historical context. Human activity causes changes in human 
society (thus affecting human consciousness itself) and in the material world . 
The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances 
and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of 
other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men 
who change circumstances." 
1 Marx 's "naturalism or humanism" challenged 19th century idealism and materialism 
while also establishing itself as the basis for critiquing any theory not explicitly founded 
on the scientifically, historically" and experientially verifiable integration of humanity 
with the material world. In this sense, Marx ' s position, which marks a radical departure 
from the metaphysical (in the sense of"removed from sense perception," time and nature) 
12 Hook, Sidney, Op. Cit. , pp. 28 and 35-36. 
13 Marx rejected the "materialism" of the British Empirical tradition because its various 
doctrines are based on theories which are unrelated to humanity' s real-life (i.e. active, 
social) experience of the world. For example, Marx classifies the individualistic 
understanding of humanity held by Empiricists as idealistic, as the "individual" is 
conceived of abstractly (that is removed from the context within which individuals 
actually exist in.) See Parsons, Howard L. , Humanism and Marx's Thought, (Springfield, 
lllinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1971 ), pp. 6, 40-45 and 170. 
14 Marx, Karl, "Theses on Feuerbach III," The Marx-Engels Reader, Edited by Tucker, 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), p. 108. 
15 Professor Fritz Wenisch pointed out that historical theory, as it is not directly 
experienced, is also an abstraction which cannot be empirically verified. Although Marx, 
Bookchin and Warren reject idealist and dualist philosophies, they rely on historical 
theories of development to justify their positions. Arne Naess, however, rejects an 
historical approach and argues that all knowledge ultimately is derived logically upon the 
basis of some first principle, which is believed to be true and derived through experience. 
Thus, according to Naess, the proper empirical foundation for a philosophy is discerned 
through an examination of one's most fundamental beliefs. 
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foundation of both classical and modem Western philosophy16, is a model upon which 
Bookchin, Warren and Naess expand. 
This chapter explores Marx 's understanding of the physically dynamic, integrated hu-
man/nature relationship as the foundation of his philosophy. It aims to clarify the 
dynamic unity between humanity and nature that is implied by Marx's interchangeable 
terms naturalism and humanism-" The first section reviews Marx's claim that the unity 
of nature (matter) and humanity (consciousness) is a natural aspect of real-life human 
activity (labor). It will be shown that naturalism is a concept of labor that integrates 
humanity with nature based on the fact that human activity, which includes the activities 
of human consciousness, is dependent upon physical reality. It also briefly reviews 
Marx 's critique of idealism and materialism to demonstrate why Marx considers "only 
naturali sm" as the legitimate basis for philosophic investigation. The second section 
examines humanism as the historical process by which labor transforms nature. It will 
examine how the process of humanism occurs as a materially-based dialectic during 
which nature historically acquires both instrumental and intrinsic value. Together these 
two sections demonstrate that the relationship between the opposites "man" and "nature" 
is "unified" in society and that this relationship changes, or accomplishes, the expression 
of various degrees of interpenetration over the course of historical development. It will 
16 See, Hancock, Roger, "The History of Metaphysics," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Vol. 5, Op. Cit., p. 289 - 290. 
17 In several instances in the "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Marx 
uses various forms of both root words "nature" and "human" interchangeably. For 
instance, see Marx, Karl, Collected Works 3, Op. Cit. , pp. 296, 303, and 336. 
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also be demonstrated that this unity of opposites defines Marx ' s understanding of 
"naturali sm or humanism." 
Thus society is the complete unity of man with nature - the true 
resurrection of nature - the accomplished naturalism of man and 
the accomplished humanism of nature. 18 
It should be noted that this chapter represents a partial analysis of Marx's view of 
nature: no attempt is made to compare views presented in the early writings of Marx to 
the Marx-Engels tradition; 19 to apply Marxist doctrine to contemporary issues in 
environmental philosophy;'0 or to judge whether or not environmentalism is a logical 
extension of Marxism." 
1. Marx's "naturalism" as the physical unity of human beings and nature. 
This section reviews Marx ' s understanding of the two aspects of the dialectical 
process of human activity, "nature" (the material or physical component) and "man" (the 
self-conscious component). They are reviewed separately, although they are interrelated 
and, therefore, always occur simultaneously in human life. Emphasis is placed on the 
emergence of this process from pre-historical nature. 
Humanity's physical link to nature forms the foundation of Marx's material approach 
to philosophy. In an explanatory paragraph immediately following Marx ' s phrase 
18 Marx, Karl, "The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Op. Cit., p. 298. 
19 There is no attempt to speculate on his views with regard to Engels 's views on nature, 
as set forth in the Dialectics of Nature forty years after Marx's early writings. Nor will 
Marx ' s early writings on "nature" and "production" be compared to the orthodox Marxist 
interpretation of these terms (an interpretation which Murray Bookchin builds into his 
critique of Marx.) 
20 See, for example, Grundman, Reiner, Marxism & Ecology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1991). 
21 See, for example, Parsons, Howard L., Marx and Engels on Ecology, (Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1977). 
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"naturalism or humanism," he describes the physical aspects of the human/nature 
relationship in terms that are unequivocally naturalist: "Man is directly a natural being."22 
ln a very literal sense, humanity is physically part of nature. However, the human/nature 
relationship of physical unity does not only refer to humanity's physical constitution and 
requirements for food , water or air; the entire process of living, the activities that 
comprise being a complete human, physically and spiritually, require a physical exchange 
with material nature. Both the material and mental activities of life are a natural part of 
human existence. 
Nature is man 's inorganic body - nature, that is, insofar as it is 
not itself human body. Man lives on nature - means that nature is 
his body, with which he must remain in continuous interchange if 
he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked to 
nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is part 
of nature." 
This direct relationship with nature, in which "man's" survival is "linked to nature," 
and "man's" physical body extends into non-human nature, describes an original state of 
'immediate unity ' in the dialectical development of human/nature relations. This 
immediate unity, or first stage of dialectical development, is based on the physical aspect 
of human/nature relations - humanity is of nature, therefore part of nature is human. 
Human and non-human nature are not separate from each other. 
Marx places his philosophy on a natural base that requires the simultaneous existence 
of living human beings and of inorganic nature. The survival activities of man, both the 
activities of the human body and those of human consciousness, comprise the "naturalism 
22 
23 
Marx, Karl. "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Op. Cit., p. 336. 
Ibid., pp. 276. 
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of man." Marx points out the facts that 1) to be ali ve, human beings require interaction 
with inorganic nature; and 2) all human physical and mental activity requires a living 
human being. He concludes, therefore, that all human activities, mental and physical, 
require a "continuous interchange" with inorganic nature. 
The fact of the existence of living human beings - physical and conscious beings -
who are part of a natural system, is the "first fact" which Marx introduces in order to 
derive his entire argument for historical materialism. Thus, the direct or immediate unity 
of human and non-human nature is the "natural base" of history. 
The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence 
of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is 
the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent 
relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either 
into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural 
conditions in which man finds himself - geological, 
orohydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must 
always set out from these natural bases and their modification in 
the course of history through the action of men. 24 
And so, the physical aspect of immediate unity in human-nature relations is a necessary 
condition for human history. Therefore, for Marx, a Young Hegelian, the purely 
physical, or directly natural, aspect of human/nature relations is also a presupposition for 
philosophy, philosophy here being understood as the comprehension of human history." 
24 Marx, Karl, "German Ideology," Op Cit, p. 113-114. 
" There are Marxist thinkers who interpret the above passage as indicating that Marxist 
philosophy is founded on history, and not the pre-existing, material human-nature 
relations. Marx regarded history as a real generalization of the particular activities of 
living human beings in society; therefore history does not serve as the ontological basis 
of Marx's philosophic argumentation. History' s specific, particular truths are based on 
physical facts of nature, so nature is not merely a static backdrop that can be ignored. For 
example, Sidney Hook, in accepting Marx's arguments concerning historical progress, 
considers the parallel to Aristotle in Marx's natural teleology as a "hangover" from 
Hegel's Naturephi/osophy, rather than as an underlying fact of Marx's first theoretical 
8 
As a presupposition of philosophy, the physical aspect of the immediate unity in 
human-nature relations is not considered worthy of investigation by Marx. Likewise, an 
investigation of the natural environment in which humans necessarily exist, is not 
relevant to philosophy, except insofar as to state the "fi rst fact" that a necessary and 
material relationship exists.26 ln other words, during the first stage of humanity's 
dialectical development, humanity, as the subject of philosophy or of self-conscious 
"man," doesn ' t exist; humanity isn't distinguishable from the rest of nature. 
For Marx, history presupposes the subsistence level existence of the human species. 
History begins with a specific type of human activity; it begins with group activity that 
progressively and intentionally (i.e., historically or knowingly) modifies, or creates 
changes in, the "geological, orohydrographical, climatic" natural base (i.e., mining rock, 
damming rivers, throwing steam into the atmosphere, etc) . It begins with the human 
species' production of the "means of subsistence" within the limits (or "conditions") 
imposed by the direct natural relationship. 
Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by 
religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to 
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to 
produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by 
their physical organisation.27 
premise. See also Mark Poster, especially Poster's defense of Sartre' s interpretation of 
Marx's history-based ontology in his book, Foucault, Marxism & History (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1984). 
26 This presupposition is challenged by ecological philosophers, who, by definition, 
explore the problems "at the vast juncture between ... eco logy and philosophy," and thus 
reexamine the concept of the human subject, in light of humanity's relationship to the 
environment. 
27 Marx, Karl, "Gennan Ideology," Op. Cit., p. 114. 
9 
According to Marx, therefore, the activity of ''production" is the defining characteristic of 
human beings in a historical context. As soon as "men" distinguish themselves "from 
animals" through the self-conscious group activity of production, the human species 
undergoes a transformation: "man" emerges from nature, understanding himself as 
separate from the other an.imals who also live on nature. 
The simultaneous emergence of "man," via the human species ' group act of 
intentional production, marks the beginning of the second stage of the dialectical 
development of humanity. The original immediate unity of human and non-human nature 
breaks down at the perceptual level ("humanity distinguishes itself"), and not at the actual 
level which persists in history as a restraint, or material need or condition of production 
(production as "conditioned by their physical organisation"). With the beginning of 
''production," the immediate unity of human beings with nature appears to dissolve, and 
the separation of "man" (as subject) from "nature" (as object) dominates humanity' s 
understanding of the human/nature relationship. 
With the emergence of history, when "men" first ''produce their means of 
subsistence," or knowingly change the natural base in order to fulfill their needs, there 
also emerges a unity of fact and value, the co-existence of an empirical truth about human 
beings and the intrinsic value, or worthiness as an end in-itself, of human beings. Marx 
presents the case as follows" . It has already been established that, according to Marx, the 
28 Marx 's discussion of the intrinsic value of human beings is brief, not well developed, 
and not phrased in terms of "value." Marx's concept of"value" is narrowly associated 
with "worth," in an economic sense, as was typical at that time. The conception of value 
and valuation in a broad sense is part of a modem trend first fully articulated "in the 
1890's." In the more modem usage of the term "value," questions of value, both as worth 
and 'what ought to be,' are grouped together in an effort to develop a theory of value and 
IO 
"first fact" is that man is a natural being, a being in direct unity with nature. However, 
"man" is also distinguished from animals and other natural beings because "man" is a 
"human" natural being. This peculiarly "human" attribute is that of intrinsic value: for 
Marx, the "human" characteristic of being is being-for-itself. 
But man is not merely a natural being: he is a human natural 
being. That is to say, he is a being for himself. Therefore he is a 
species-being, and has to confirm and manifest himself as such 
both in his being and his knowing." 
In the above quote, Marx demonstrates that his understanding of human beings as ends, 
valuable for their own sake, follows the classical Greek (and Hegelian) association of 
wisdom with that which is pursued for its own sake.30 As a "species," man is an 
empirically existent natural being; as a human being, man is self-knowing and therefore is 
intrinsically valuable as a "being for himself." Living, as a process of confirming and 
manifesting oneself, unites non-human nature ("his being") with humanity (the 
intrinsically valuable, "being for himself' and self-conscious ("his knowing")). 
Therefore, it can be concluded that what is historically human. for Marx, is the intrinsic 
value which "man" brings to the natural activities required for staying alive. This 
attribute of activity, that of self-awareness and intrinsic value, is what separates 
production from the merely life sustaining activities of non-human natural beings. 
valuation which includes "economics, ethics, aesthetics, jurisprudence, education, and 
perhaps even logic and epistemology;" Frankena, William K, "Value and Valuation," The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume Eight, Op. Cit., p. 229. 
29 Marx, Karl, "The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Op. Cit., p. 337. 
'
0 See discussion of the Greek conception of wisdom in Blanshard, Brad, "Wisdom," 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol 8., Op. Cit. , pp. 322-323. 
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Marx's claim that naturalism is distinct from both idealism and materialism is based 
on his understanding that first and foremost, human life activity is based on the direct 
unity of human and non-human nature; and second, human life activity is characterized 
by a theoretical awareness of the difference between human and non-human nature. On 
this basis, Marx's naturalism can be classified as a modem realist philosophy; that is, it is 
a philosophy which recognizes the independent existence of the material world with 
regard to human knowledge." Marx's naturalism is, therefore, opposed to all forms of 
idealism, i.e., those philosophic views which do consider the universe to be "dependent 
on mind or in some sense mental."" For Marx, although human beings cause history and 
create changes in nature, human beings did not materially create themselves or the rest of 
nature in the first place. Historically, "nature exists prior to man 's transformative labor 
upon it;"33 logically, humanity exists in nature prior to the time when it "begins" to posit 
itself as "other" and distinct from other parts of non-human nature. By adding the 
element of "production" to the material human/nature relation of unity, Marx is asserting 
the primacy of human activity, of historically-situated living human beings, over eternally 
true ideas, whether these ideas are invoked to support an idealistic or materialistic 
conception of human reality. 
Further, in demanding that philosophy assert the primacy of historically-situated 
human activity as the unity of theoretical activity in a direct and dependent relationship to 
material nature, Marx is also asserting that the unique and particular form of human 
31 
32 
33 
Hirst, R. J., "Realism," Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7, Op. Cit., pp. 77. 
Ibid., p. 77. 
Parsons, Howard L., Op. Cit., pp. 10-11. 
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activity in nature functions as the basis of philosophic abstraction. It has already been 
noted that Marx does not think that the particular details of the "naturism of man," or the 
analysis of the "geologic, orohydrographical ... " conditions in which humanity is 
immersed, are suitable subjects for philosophy. However, a characteristic feature of 
Marx's philosophy (especially his mature works) is his analysis of the particular details of 
the "humanism of nature," that is, an analysis of that aspect of productive activity which 
individuals "find" in existence and modify through labor. 
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not 
dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be 
made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, their 
activity and the material conditions under which they live, both 
those which they find existing and those produced by their activity. 
These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical way."34 
Thus, the concrete and particular occurrences of life, the "real individuals" and "their 
activity and [the] material conditions," serve as the premises for philosophic analysis and 
abstraction. In Marx's tum to nature and active individuals, particular and unique 
realities form the basis of Marx 's modified empirical, theoretical, analyses of the 
transformation of nature by labor. 
From the above analysis, Marx can be understood as demanding that a) philosophers 
incorporate the procedures of empirical verification into their investigations in order to 
demonstrate the veracity of their concepts; b) living human beings serve as the basis for 
all abstractions and theorizing; and c) the social and natural reality created in history by 
labor be recognized as the appropriate subject of philosophy. Points "a)" and "b )" are the 
basis of Marx 's naturalism as an approach to philosophy. Similarly, his naturalist tum to 
34 Marx, Karl, "The German Ideology," Op. Cit., p. 113. 
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human/nature unity as basis for philosophy serves as a model approach taken by Murray 
Bookchin, Karen Warren and Arne Naess, all of whom regard the establishment of 
concrete human experience as the founding premise for philosophy. However, there are 
major differences among these thinkers, and between them and Marx, with regard to the 
interpretation of the "human" aspect of the dynamic human/nature relationship (point 
"c"). Therefore, an analysis of Marx 's concept of the process of human life activity (a.k.a. 
- production) is required in order to clarify some of the key issues which bind and 
separate Marx from Bookchin, Warren and Naess. 
2. The "humanism of nature:" the human transformation of nature. 
This section examines Marx's understanding of humanism as labor' s dialectical 
transformation of nature. First, Marx 's material , or rather "naturalist," transformation of 
the Hegelian dialectic of activity is examined. Second, it will be demonstrated, through 
an analysis of Marx's critique of Hegel's idealism, that Marx 's version of the dialectic of 
history is based on the natural/human labor process which creates society and transforms 
nature. Third, several of Marx's historical examples of the human transformation, or 
humanism, of nature are reviewed, with particular attention paid to how Marx 
understands the value of nature. Together, these three points illustrate that Marx 's 
understanding of the "humanism of nature" revolves around the laboring relationship of 
human beings, as conscious and intrinsically valuable individuals, to nature, with nature 
here understood historically as increasingly incorporated into human society. 
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(i) 
The grounding of philosophy in nature, or more specifically on the dialectical hu-
man/nature relationship, permeates the entire structure of Marx's philosophy. In an 
analysis of the Gnmdrisse, Carol Gould acknowledges the primacy of the opposition 
between "man" and "nature" in Marx's materialist version of the Hegelian dialectic: 
''Thus the primary sense of objectification for Marx is production, where the subject is in 
his terms ' humanity' and the object is 'nature."'" It has already been shown that Marx's 
concept of the production of "the means of subsistence" requires an active, living human 
being involved in the externalization of him/herself in inorganic nature. Similarly, 
Marx 's concept of the "humanism of nature" is a dialectical process of objectification (the 
realization one's being through the self-conscious and externally manifested positing of 
oneself in the "other"), which unites his naturalist understanding of human activity with 
the Hegelian dialectic of abstract mind. In order for Marx to demonstrate the natural 
basis of his version of the dialectic, he examines the process through which "human" and 
"nature" emerge as opposing aspects of labor and through which nature is historically 
transformed by human activity. 
As an historical dialectic, the human and natural aspects of labor progress through 
three distinct stages of development (immediate unity, opposition and synthetic unity). 
As explained above, during the first stage of the dialectic of human activity, humanity did 
not exist for itself as "man" in contrast to "nature." Immediate unity is pre-historic. At 
35 Gould, Carol C., Marx 's Social Ontology, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1978), 
p. 43. 
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this stage, therefore, the process of life activity for the human species and for other 
organic life forms is the same: According to Marx 
as a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he ["man"]is a 
suffering, conditioned and limited creature, like animals and plants. 
That is to say, the objects of his instincts exist outside him ... 36 
The terms "suffering," "conditioned" and "limited," refer to the external (or objective) 
satisfaction of needs. This immediate physical unity of humanity and non-human nature 
with regard to life sustaining activities contains the seeds of its own differentiation into 
opposites, which then form the beginnings of human history. The seeds of this perceptual 
differentiation are not physical; that is, in the immediate unity of human beings with 
nature, there exists an actual, particular characteristic (a mental characteristic) that is 
unique to humanity. In defining humanity as distinct from plants and animals, all of 
whom are "conditioned and limited" by their natural needs, Marx indicates that only 
humanity is "suffering;" that is to say, only humanity is intellectually and emotionally 
conscious of experiencing the physical conditions and limitations created by the fact that 
the satisfaction of essential human needs is fulfilled objectively in nature-" Thus, 
according to Marx, survival level activity, the direct link of the human species as part of 
nature, is the condition of immediate unity from which the conscious, or self-conscious, 
component of the dialectical process of objectification emerges, thereby internally 
generating the opposition between man as subject and nature as object. 38 
36 Marx, Karl, "The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Op. Cit., p. 336. 
37 McClellan, David, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, (London: Macmillan and 
Co. Ltd., 1969), pp. 107-108. 
38 Bookchin, Warren and Naess all consider Marx's failure to explore the motivation or 
origin of human self-consciousness as problematic with regard to the formulation of a 
natural-based, realistic ethics. Implicitly Marx's failure is addressed by each of them 
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For Marx, then, the second stage of the dialectical development of human activity has 
its origins in nature. From a natural base, Marx's philosophy prioritizes the activity of 
living, human beings over the activity of Absolute Mind. Gould recognizes that Marx 
offers a materialist relocation of the Hegelian dialectic. 
Further, in distinction from Hegel, Marx sees the dialectic of social 
development not as a series of stages in the development of the 
Idea, that is as a dialectic of thought, but rather as one generated by 
the actions of real, concretely existing individuals. In this respect 
Marx gives ontological priority to such active existing individuals, 
39 
Marx's analysis of the second stage of dialectical development, then, as a 'mediated 
unity' or objectified unity in which human activity changes both nature and "man," can 
be understood as a humanist reworking of Hegel's dialectic of abstract activity. 
(ii) 
Marx's reworking of the Hegelian dialectic can be viewed as part of his attempt to 
eliminate abstract thought as the basis of philosophy. In the brief section that follows, 
Marx's critique of Hegel's idealistic version of the process of objectification is reviewed 
in order to illustrate how Marx grounds the origin of the dialectical tension in nature 
rather than in Spirit. 
through the development of concepts concerning the relation between autonomous human 
consciousness and nature. In an explicit discussion of this topic, Max Scheler notes 
Marx 's " legitimate opposition to the classical theory" of spirit, in which the idea is an 
autonomous, creative power, is marred by its total lack of recognition of any autonomy of 
spirit. Thus, according to Scheler, Marx's productive, labor-based, social conception of 
intrinsic value is incapable of supporting the formulation of an ethic. For discussion, see 
Scheler, Max, Man 's Place In Nature, translated by Meyerhoff, Hans (New York: The 
Noonday Press, 1971), pp. 36-40 and 62-63 . 
39 Gould, Carol, Op. Cit. , p. 28. 
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The key to Hegel's greatness, in Marx's opinion, is his discovery that labor is an 
active dialectical process of objectification. For Marx, labor is a process of 
"self-creation:" "man," through the activity of human labor (understood as a process by 
which objects external to man become "man 's inorganic body"), changes the natural base: 
"man" changes "his circumstances" and thereby changes (or creates) himself. Through 
this process of objectification, which causes changes according to the principle of the 
"dialectic of negativity,"40 "man" goes through a historical transition from a merely 
natural being to a "real" (fully actualized) human being. This process, which Hegel 
recognized in an idealistic form, is the one by which the activity of labor creates "real 
man," as the naturo-historical human being who has fully mani fested himself in the 
external world . 
The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phanomenologie and 
its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and 
generating principle, is thus that Hegel conceives the self-creation 
of man as a process, conceives objectification as the loss of the 
object, as alienation and as transcendence of thi s alienation; that he 
thus grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man 
- true, because real man - as the outcome of man 's own labor." 
Thus, in the passage above, Marx acknowledges his acceptance of Hegel's 'dialectic of 
negativity.' Yet, in contrast to Hegel, Marx's historical-dialectical process of labor is 
'
0 The "dialectic of negativity" is an aspect of the dialectical method, the critical 
aspect that '"produces movement which makes history"' due to the mental process of 
abstraction in which humans posit "X" (Being, capital, nature, humanity etc.) as a general 
category (a universal) distinct from, or in opposition to, "x" as a particular thing. The 
abstract aspect of the human activity of self-objectification in nature is, in Hegel's words, 
a '"negative self-relation; in other words it draws a distinction between it and itself. "' For 
discussion, see MacGregor, David, The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1984), pp. 160-1 63 and 244-246. 
41 Marx, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Op. Cit., pp. 332-333. 
18 
based on nature and the power of human life activity, not on the power of the activity of 
Abstract Mind. 
Marx ' s critique of Hegel is not restricted to the process of labor as the creation of 
objective man; it also extends to the dialectical history of society and to labor's 
transformation of nature. For Marx, humanity has a laboring or productive relation to 
nature, through which nature acquires a "human character" (i.e. , nature is understood, 
used and valued by human and is physically transformed into products for human use). 
According to Marx, Hegel commits two "error[s)" with regard to his understanding of 
the activity of labor. 
There is a double error in Hegel. 
The first.. When, for instance, wealth, state power, etc., are 
understood by Hegel as entities estranged from the human being, 
this only happens in their form as thoughts ...... The whole history 
of the alienation process and the whole process of the retraction of 
the alienation is therefore nothing but the history of the production 
of abstract (i.e., absolute) llXVlll thought - of logical, speculative 
thought." 
Hegel's second error concerns the continuous transformation, or process of 
"self-creation," of the world. 
In the second place: the vindication of the objective world for 
man . . . The human character of nature and of the nature created 
by history - man's products - appears in the form that they are 
the products of abstract mind, and as such phases of mind -
thought-entities .43 
The creation of products from nature is understood by Hegel as a result of abstract 
activity (of the "thinking mind") rather than of naturo-historical activity (of the laboring 
42 
43 
Ibid. , p. 331. 
Ibid., p. 332. 
19 
human being). So, for Marx, the objective world of nature (in its pristine state or as the 
end product of a social industrial process) is, like society, a historical result of the human 
activity of labor, where human is understood as integrated by definition with nature. 
(iii) 
To fully understand Marx's phrase, "human character of nature and of the nature 
created by history," the dialectical process of labor which transforms nature needs to be 
examined. This process begins simultaneously with the "humanism of nature" in history 
as humanity' s first attempts at "producing their means of subsistence" and continues 
through to capitalism; it ends with communism. Marx defines communism as the 
attainment of a state in which all of humanity is naturalized - humanity expresses itself 
in all of nature and in which all of nature is humanized - all of nature is transformed by 
labor. This full development of the relations between human and non-human nature 
implies an overcoming of the dialectical opposition and its yielding to a new stage of 
synthetic unity and harmony. 
This communism as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, 
and as fully developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the 
genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature and 
between man and man. 44 
Marx 's discussion of human-nature relations during the second stage of the dialectic, 
when the opposition between "man" and "nature" is the main tension in the labor process, 
reveals his understanding of the phrase the "human character of nature" and the basis for 
his economic conception of value. 
44 Marx, Karl, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Op. Cit. , p. 296. 
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ln order for humanity to impart its character to nature, the distinctly human 
characteristics, that of the self-conscious separation from nature and the intrinsic value of 
being human, must co-mingle with non-human nature. The term "mediation of labor" 
describes this co-mingling or interpenetration of opposites in a single direction from 
humanity to nature. It is the application of human knowledge to the human/nature 
relation, an active process that introduces the human quality of intrinsic value, of existing 
as an end in itself, into inorganic nature. Literally, the human feature of being 
intrinsically valuable passes into nature. This passage of intrinsic value from human 
beings into nature through the socio-historical process of production comprises the 
second stage of the dialectic of human/nature relations. The process encompasses the 
history of the becoming of Communism, from the first self-conscious acts of production 
marking the beginning of the history of"man" through to the overcoming of Capitalism. 
Thus, the "humanism of nature" is the value of nature; and the extent of the "humanism 
of nature" is the extent to which human labor has made nature valuable - in an 
economic sense of bringing nature into the social fabric of exchange. 
The association of intrinsic value with Marx's economistic use of the term "value" is 
implied by the sharp distinction he draws between the utility of nature and the value of 
nature when "mediated by labor." Nature has "use-value4"' (i.e. utility), but no value (i.e. 
intrinsic or instrumental worth) without the input of labor. 
A thing can be a use-value without being a value. This is the case 
whenever its utility to man is not mediated through labour. Air, 
" Marx's use of the term "use-value" in this case introduces a confusion, as he clearly 
indicates in the following quote that no "value" is present. The thing referenced is merely 
of"use." 
virgin soil, natural meadows, unplanted forests, etc. fall into this 
category.46 
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In order to demonstrate empirically that the "humanism of nature" is the intrinsic 
value of"man" objectified in "nature," Marx analyzes the particular details of historically 
real examples of things (land, money and women" ) which are objects of human need. 
The "human" aspect of the dual (human/nature) character of the products of nature is 
obscured under the capitalist mode of commodity production, the mode of production in 
which the historically growing perception of nature and humanity as mutually exclusive 
is extreme. Marx combats this perception by arguing that the unity of humanity and 
nature is revealed through an analysis of value and objective need . It should be noted that 
value, for Marx, is linked directly with objective needs; and therefore it assumes the 
perception of a subject-object division that characterizes stage two of the dialectical 
relation between human beings and nature. Marx does not discuss value in relation to the 
pre-historical, subsistence (animal-like) existence of the human species. 
Marx's concept of value, as the analysis of his three examples shows, is based upon 
the differentiation of value into two united, yet distinct aspects, that of intrinsic value and 
utility. For Marx, intrinsic value is associated only with the self-conscious, productive 
activity of human beings. Human activity is the only good which is valuable in and of 
itself; and historically, labor is the human activity which creates value in nature. 
Therefore, historical nature, as the product of human activity, has value because it is an 
46 Marx, Capital, Op. Cit., p. 131 . 
47 Women, while not "things," are treated in a thing-like manner 
with regard to their being an "object" of need. The "subjectivity" 
of women is not meant to be excluded in this example. 
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intrinsic good, although only to the extent that it has been modified or created by labor. 
Also, for Marx, the utility of things objectified by "man" is a historical process in which 
"use-values" (things untouched by human labor and hence valueless) become things 
possessing instrumental values (things modified by, and hence containing, the intrinsic 
value of human labor). Thus, the following examples of Marx's analyses of value and 
objects of human need reveal the unity of human/nature relations from a humanist 
viewpoint through the recognition of intrinsic value of nature - in the form of social 
exchange value based on human labor. At the same time, they reveal the unity of 
human/nature relations from a naturali st viewpoint through the recognition of instrumen-
tal value and use value, wherein a thing is perceived as merely useful in satisfying a 
human need. 
The first of Marx 's examples concerning the process in which the productivity of 
labor transforms part of nature involves the cultivation of land. Virgin soil (useful, but 
not of "value") comes under plow and is transformed into farmland (an economically 
valuable thing in any human society whose members are capable of distinguishing virgin 
from non-virgin soil, and hence perceiving nature objectively). As farmland, the soil now 
has instrumental value. The "value" component of the soil ' s instrumentality is dependent 
upon the intrinsic value of human labor. As farmland, the intrinsically valuable part of 
nature is the part of nature that "man" takes as his " inorganic body," an extension of his 
being in an external world . Farmland, as opposed to virgin soil, thus has value. This type 
of usefulness is termed "instrumental value" by Marx because it is both instrumental in 
(or useful as a means for) satisfying human objective needs and valuable because is 
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possesses characteristics by virtue of its transformation by human labor (labor being an 
intrinsic good). The intrinsic value of historical nature and of commodities is not 
recognized under relations associated with the capitalist mode of production, wherein the 
"primary value of nature is its instrumental value in the production of economic goods. "48 
Instrumental value, like "use-value," posits nature as a resource available for human use 
and/or exploitation. Thus, the transformed products of nature, a mere commodity with 
only a material (inactive or factual) existence, actually possess value, even if only in the 
fom1 of instrumental value, which is in tum dependent upon human beings objectifying 
themselves in nature and therefore is dependent upon the extension of intrinsic value into 
nature. 
The second example of the "humanism of nature" and the "naturalism of man" con-
cems the transformation of metal into money. A helpful examination of the unity of 
nature and value in the case of an abstract product, money, occurs in the Gnmdrisse. In 
this case, gold has a dual character. First, it is, in fact, a natural object, part of inorganic 
nature; and therefore linked to humanity through the "naturism of man." Second, it is a 
social product; part of human society in its character as the symbolic form of exchange 
value and the quantitative form of labor value. In the second sense of being money, gold 
is humanized nature. Although nature may be more difficult to see after undergoing 
uni-directional change via human hands, nature is the material upon which, and with 
which, man exercises his powers. Clearly, inorganic nature is part of money; yet money 
is also a social relation: 
" Karen Warren, "Introduction: Part llI: Ecofeminism," in Radical Environmentalism: 
Philosophy and Tactics by Peter C. List, p. 255. 
-Gold and silver, in and of themselves, are not money. Nature does 
not produce money, any more than it produces a rate of exchange 
or a banker. ... To be money is not a natural attribute of gold and 
silver, and is therefore quite unknown to the physicist, chemist etc. 
as such. But money is directly gold and silver.49 
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In money, then, the two phases of dialectical development are simultaneously existing, an 
original unity (i.e. product of nature) and a mediated unity (i.e. product of labor) with 
human attributes of exchange value created through the historical process of objectificat-
ion. The human attribute dominates, as the most obvious characteristic of gold coin in 
economic circulation is the fact that it is money. 
The third type of transformation involves people: the case wherein the object of use 
and need fulfillment is another human being (i.e., the proletariat, the slave, the female, 
respectively, fill the needs of the capitali st, the master, the male). In the case of humans 
objectify ing other humans, the unity of the material facts of nature and intrinsic value of 
humanity is most clearly expressed in male-female relations. Marx pays scant attention 
to male-female relations. His analysis of these relations in "The Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," however, is of particular interest in that it does not 
neatly conform to the pre-social/pre-historical, historical and communist stages of 
economic development. Furthermore, both Murray Bookchin and Karen Warren return to 
the historical origin of male-female social relations as a point of departure for integrating 
the foundations of a nature-based ethic into value theory,'0 thus abandoning Marx's 
historical and labor based conception of value and ethics. 
49 Marx, Karl , Gnmdrisse, Op. Cit., p. 239. 
50 Naess takes a completely different approach; one that is more 
in line with Scheler's critique of the naturalist theory of Marx. 
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In Marx's analysis of marriage and male-female relations, he clearly indicates that the 
unity of humanity with nature is a fact of life in all stages of the dialectic. This unity is 
trans-historical, although always manifested in a particular forms. At the animal-like, 
subsistence-level (the first stage of the dialectic), male-female relations are necessary and 
are part of humanity's immediate relation with nature. 
The direct, natural and necessary relation of person to person is the 
relation of man to woman. ln this natural species-relationship 
man's relation to nature is immediately his relation to man, just as 
his relation to man is immediately his relation to nature - his own 
natural destination." 
This immediate relation precludes objectification, and, therefore, is not a value relation. 
Human beings, as ends in themselves and as intrinsically valuable beings, do not exist at 
this stage of development. Neither is the male-female relationship, in its immediate unity 
with nature, an ethical relationship. Rather, for Marx, it is a relationship of necessity and 
destiny. By implication, we can conclude that Marx, at most, regarded pre-historical 
male and female members of the human species as "suffering" creatures, and, therefore, 
at least possessing some degree of emotional consciousness distinct from non-human 
animal awareness. It is this pre-social, emotional consciousness that Bookchin and 
Warren explore as the source of ethical sensibil ity and of a peculiarly female perspective, 
respective 1 y. 
Ethical human relations and the instrumental value of nature are part of male-female 
relations throughout the historical phases of property development, as well as into the 
early communist phase of the dialectic (represented by the call for the abolition of private 
51 Marx, Karl, "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Op. Cit., p. 295. 
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property and marriage). In these dialectical stages of male-female relations, Marx 's 
understanding of the intrinsic value of humanity as objectified in nature is directly 
expressed as equating to the humanization of nature and the naturalization of humanity. 
While ethical discussion is limited to Marx 's moral judgments concerning the 
"degradation" of man with regard to "the approach to woman as the spoil and handmaid 
of communal lust," the analysis of the instrumental value of one human being to another 
contains Marx's recognition of the unity of both instrumental and intrinsic value, along 
with that of nature and humanity. 
From the character of this relationship follows how much man as a 
species-being, as man, has come to be himself and to comprehend 
himself; the relation of man to woman is the most natural relation 
of human being to human being. It therefore reveals the extent to 
which man's natural behavior becomes human, or the extent to 
which the human essence in him has become a natural essence -
the extent to which his human nature has come to be natural to 
him. This relationship also reveals the extent to which man's need 
has become a human need; the extent to which, therefore, the other 
person as a person has become for him a need - the extent to 
which he in his individual existence is at the same time a social 
being." 
This unity of the value of humanity and that of nature, like the unity of humanity and 
nature, is based upon Marx's concept of the historically progressive, self-conscious 
integration of humanity with nature through the objective fulfillment of needs (i.e., 
though labor) . As women and men transform themselves from merely natural beings into 
human beings in a social process, their relationship parallels I) the extension of 
intrinsically valuable human beings into nature (i .e. naturalized humanity), via the 
" Marx, Karl , "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844," Op. Cit., p. 296. 
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intrinsic value of labor; and 2) the creation of an instrumentally valuable (i.e. humanized) 
nature. 
From these three examples concerning land, money and women, it can be stated that 
Marx ' s understanding of the role of labor in the transformation of nature recognizes the 
intrinsic value of nature in the products and social institutions of capitalism. Further, 
even though this value is predominately manifested in the form of instrumental value, the 
complete "humanism of nature" holds out the future possibility that once humanity 
completely objectifies itself in nature, the "brutish" relation of use will yield to a 
harmonious relation that allows for the harmonious and synthetic unity of human beings 
and nature. 
Conclusion: It has been demonstrated that Marx ' s understanding of human/nature 
unity underlies the material-humanist metaphysical foundations of Marx's philosophy, 
his critique of idealism and consequent demand that philosophic premises rest on the 
concrete, details of real life experience, rather than on religious, philosophic or scientific 
theories. His naturalist/humanist approach to philosophy serves as a model for 
philosophers in the modern realist tradition, including Bookchin, Warren and Naess. 
Further, Marx ' s view of nature incorporates the intangible world of the historical, social 
reality created by living human beings into the base of ' verifiable' knowledge (i .e. 
knowledge of physical and material matter), marking his position as distinct from pure 
scientific empiricism, which restricts itself to propositions and abstract facts and excludes 
human experience. This abandonment of a dualist understanding of the concepts of 
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human/nature, mind/body and fact/value also plays a prominent role in Bookchin's, 
Warren 's and Naess's conception of human/nature relations. 
ln Marx's conception of a naturalism that equals humanism and a "humanism [that] 
equals naturalism," humans dominate (or define) the relationship. Humanity is active, 
while nature changes only insofar as nature is acted upon by humans. While neither 
Bookchin, nor Warren nor Naess challenges the idea that human self-consciousness 
perrneates the concept of human/nature unity, they do question Marx 's claim that human 
self-consciousness (i.e. defined by Marx as the ability to abstract from or objectify a 
situation), mixed with nature in the process of production, adequately defines the 
human/nature relationship. All three philosophers agree that Marx's understanding of the 
intrinsic value nature as indirect, as a function of human labor's creation of instrumental 
value in nature, is an inadequate basis for the articulation of an ethical relation between 
human and non-human nature. 
The next three chapters demonstrate the debt that Bookchin, Warren and Naess owe 
to Marx's humanist/naturalist view of human/nature relations. Each chapter also 
emphasizes those aspects of their respective philosophies which branch off from the 
realist foundation that Marx erected, and does so in order to develop a conception of the 
concretely-real and dynamic human/nature relationship which also incorporates, or 
supports, ethics. 
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CHAPTER 2: BOOKCHIN: NATURE AS THE SOURCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
"Social Ecology," a field of study first advanced by Murray Bookchin, may also be 
characterized as "dialectical naturalism. '"' The use of the terms "dialectical naturalism" 
and "social ecology" to describe Bookchin 's philosophy is indicative of his understanding 
of human society as part of the process of the dialectical development of nature - or 
more specifically (and like Marx), of the dialectical development of human consciousness 
from within nature. Although Bookchin ' s dialectical view of nature is not "Marxist," his 
debt to Marxism and his "earlier commitment to socialist orthodoxies of all forms"" is 
evident in his approach to philosophy as a dialectical development of society that is 
grounded in nature. A key difference between Marx and Bookchin is Bookchin's 
rejection of humanism (and of humanism's equation with naturalism by Marx) . For 
Marx, the central focus of the material dialectic is human beings (in a socio-natural, 
historical context), whi le for Bookchin, the central focus of the material dialectic is nature 
(in a socio-natural, historical context) . This difference in orientation leads to major 
differences in the structure of the dialectic and in the conceptualization of what Marx 
termed the human aspect of the dialectic, which involved relationships between human 
consciousness, human activity, non-human nature and value. 
This chapter shows that Murray Bookchin 1) reworks Marx's conception of historic 
dialectic so as provide a pre-human, evolutionary foundation for human consciousness in 
nature, a topic which Marx did not address; and, in so doing 2) arrives at a broader 
53 John Clark, "Introduction, Part Four: Social Ecology," Environmental Philosophy, 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1993) pp. 345. 
" Bookchin, Murray, The Ecology of Freedom, (Pal Alto, California: Cheshire Books, 
1982), p. 31. 
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conception of the role of nature in the dialectic of historical development than did Marx. 
In analyzing Bookchin's reconception of the historical dialectic, it will be demonstrated 
that Bookchin replaces Marx's notion that the perception of the dialectical tension 
between "man" and "nature" originates in human productive activity, with the notion that 
this tension originates in the activity of human consciousness." Also, this chapter 
explores Bookchin 's dialectical understanding of the activity of human consciousness'•: it 
examines his claim that the two antithetical aspects of human consciousness which 
evolve from nature are "sensibility," a term that characterizes the intuitive, ethical aspect 
of human consciousness, and "consciousness," a term that characterizes the analytical 
aspect of human consciousness. 
1. Bookchin's material dialectic of the activity of consciousness - The purpose of 
this section is to demonstrate that Bookchin, while modeling himself on Marx's material 
realism, modifies Marx 's dialectic, shifting the focus of the dialectical tension in stage 
two of Marx's dialectic from human productive activity in an economic sense to the 
activity of human consciousness. It will be shown that although Bookchin and Marx 
" "Perhaps one of social ecology's most important contributions to the current 
ecological discussion is the view that the basic problems which pit society against nature 
emerge from within social development itself - not between society and nature." 
Bookchin, Murray, "Society and Ecology," Remaking Society, (Boston, MA: The South 
End Press, 1990), p. 32. 
'
6 Bookchin's terminology is a little inconsistent, but his concept ofa developing 
self-consciousness in nature that has both ethical/intuitive and analytical aspects is the 
same throughout the changes in terms. Sometimes, he uses the terms "consciousness" 
and "reason" as umbrella terms, which describe both aspects of the dialectic. See for 
example, pp. 38 and 304, respectively of The Ecology of Freedom, Op. Cit. (also cited in 
this paper, see below). At other times, the term "consciousness" refers to humanity's 
capacity for analytical or abstract thinking. See The Ecology of Freedom, p. 19 or 
footnote 62 of this paper. 
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agree on the physical aspect of human/nature unity, their conceptions of the conscious-
ness (or "human" aspect of human/nature unity) differ substantially. Marx understands 
directed, self-conscious activity as a human characteristic that is continuously influenced 
by (and does not exist without) its physical interaction with and material dependence 
upon nature. Bookchin regards directed, self-conscious activity as a characteristic of 
nature that reaches its highest stage of development in human consciousness. 
In distinction from Marx, Bookchin sees the dialectic of social ecological develop-
ment not as a series of stages in the development of humanity, that is, a dialectic of 
human activity, but rather as a series of stages generated by nature's real and concretely 
developing potential for consciousness." For Bookchin, "consciousness, the teleological 
end of nature, is self-creating and humanity is its highest expression."" 
For Bookchin, the fully developed consciousness of nature is not existent in all of 
nature (a position which Bookchin would be the first to declare as anthropomorphic or 
part of the misguided Eastern philosophy of 'cosmic oneness. ')59 Rather, Bookchin 
understands the consciousness of nature as a dialectical process in which nature actualizes 
its own potential for self-consciousness through the activity of evolution. 
57 This sentence is a paraphrase of Carol Gould's description of Marx's adaptation of 
Hegel's dialectic. See Footnote 37, p. 16, Chapter 1 of this paper. 
" Bookchin, Murray, The Ecology of Freedom, Op. Cit., p. 38. 
59 
"May we not reasonably ask why the natural world has to be peopled with earth gods 
and goddesses when natural evolution exhibits a marvelous power of its own to generate 
such a rich and wondrous variety of living beings? ... Is it not the crudest form of 
'anthropocentrism ' (to use a word for the projection of the human into the natural that 
evokes so much disdain in ecology movements) to introduce deified forms created by the 
human imagination into the natural world in the name of ecological 'spirituality?'" 
Bookchin, Remaking Society, Op. Cit., pp. 12-13. 
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In the passage below, Bookchin demonstrates his agreement with Marx's 
historical-materialist approach to history. 
Until very recently, human society developed around the brute 
issues posed by unavoidable material scarcity and their subjective 
counterparts in denial, renunciation and guilt. The great historic 
splits that destroyed early organic societies, dividing man from 
nature and man from man, had their origins in the problems of 
survival, in problems that involved the mere maintenance of 
human existence. Material scarcity provided the historic rationale 
for the development of the patriarchal family, private property, 
class domination and the state.60 
Within limits, Bookchin confirms his acceptance of Marx's predominately 
instrumentalist view of human/nature relations6 1 during the course of human history: 
Since the rise of patriarchy, humanity has used non-human nature to survive and 
dominant groups within human society have used other human beings to satisfy their 
objective, natural needs. 
For Marx, the dialectic of history was a material one, having sprung from the physical 
unity of human beings with nature. From that "natural base" human social relations, in 
interaction with nature, developed into an antithesis based on the material conditions and 
60 Bookchin, Murray, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, (Berkeley, California: Ramparts Press, 
Inc.) 1971, p. 9. 
6 1 Bookchin interprets Marx through the Orthodox Marxist tradition, which holds that 
Marx 's emphasis on material relations indicates his exclusion of non-material aspects of 
human consciousness and activity. (A position challenged in Chapter One: see claim that 
Marx is not strictly empirical , p. 25) Under the Orthodox interpretation, "material 
scarcity provide[s] the historic rationale," and Marx's philosophy begins with historical 
interpretation. However, this interpretation differs from the one presented in Chapter 
One, wherein Marx merely isolated material need as natural need. Labor, understood as 
human activity in broad sense, includes the development of language, religion and culture 
and is more than mere economic ' production relations'. See Marx, Karl , The German 
Ideology, Op. Cit. Discrepancies among the various interpretations of Marx's early 
works of philosophy is not the subject of this thesis. 
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activity (activity for survival) of human beings. Bookchin deviates from this Marxist, 
labor-based conception of the dialectic in history in two ways. 
First, Bookchin expands the time frame of human history, beginning philosophical 
analysis of human life at a time before the human opposition with nature occurred (that 
is, during Marx's stage of unity between "man" and "nature"). By contrast, Marx begins 
human history and philosophical analysis with the human/nature opposition in the second 
stage of self-conscious, perceived production. For Bookchin, the human subject exists as 
subject prior to what Marx considers as the emergence of humanity. 
Second, Bookchin regards the future transition to the third and highest stage of 
dialectical development to be contingent upon changes in human consciousness, instead 
of upon changes wrought by human labor as it moves from Marx's capitalist to 
communist stage. Bookchin, unlike Marx, locates the origins of society in "early 
organic" human communities that existed prior to any split in opposition to nature. 
Bookchin ' s reference to the "great historic splits that destroyed early organic societies" 
indicates that he understands societies, and therefore human history, to have existed as 
human societies prior to the occurrence of divisions that stemmed from material 
conditions and property relations of domination. Therefore, for Bookchin, self-conscious 
material activity is not necessarily linked to a dialectical opposition to nature and to labor, 
as it is for Marx. From this germ of an idea, Bookchin's analyzes "early organic 
societies" in search of the material source of a dialectical development in society which 
encompasses the value of harmony with nature. He does so by reworking Marx's own 
analysis. 
Although their [preliterate peoples] logical operations may be identical to 
ours formally, their values differ from ours qualitatively. The further back 
we go to communities that lack economic classes and a political State -
communities that might well be called organic societies because of their 
intense solidarity internally and with the nature world - the greater 
evidence we find of an outlook toward life that visualized people, things, 
and relations in terms of their uniqueness rather than their 'superiority' or 
' inferiority. ' 62 
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ln contrast to Marx, Bookchin asserts that not only the physical aspect of humanity's 
direct unity with nature is carried forward into society, but humanity's consciousness has 
a direct link with nature, at an ethical level and not merely at a productive one. Further-
more, while Marx only considers the impact of human activity on nature, and humanity's 
ability to impart value to nature, Bookchin considers the impact of natural activity on 
humanity" and claims that nature has the ability to impart value to humanity. 
Marx tried to root humanity's identity and self-discovery in its 
productive interaction with nature. But I must add that not only 
does humanity place its imprint on the natural world and transform 
it, but also nature places its imprint on the human world and 
transforms it.64 
In addition, Bookchin regards consciousness, not material conditions, as the key to 
ushering in the post-capitalist phase of the historical, dialectical transition. He seeks to 
reinterpret Marx's material dialectic because the material abundance of capitalism, and 
the Soviet experiment with communism, did not lead to a state of harmonious 
human-nature or of human-human relations, as predicted for the third stage of 
communism by Marx. Bookchin argues that if the material activity of production drove 
62 Bookchin, Murray, The Ecology of Freedom, Op. Cit., p. 44. 
63 See discussion, Chapter One, page 20, regarding the single direction 
or source of activity yielding the penetration of value and human 
self-consciousness into nature. 
64 Ibid., p. 32. 
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society, then surely the material abundance of today would have already brought us to a 
culture of freedom and harmony. The possibility of there being enough material wealth 
for everyone, which Marx held to be a possibility of the imminent future, has, according 
to Bookchin, arrived. Bookchin 's rejection of Marx's predictions about communism and 
its attendant harmony of humanity and nature, then, is based on a realistic assessment of 
twentieth century technological capacities and social failures. 
We of this century have finally opened the prospect of material 
abundance for all to enjoy - a sufficiency in the means of life 
without the need for grinding day-to-day toil. We have discovered 
resources, both for man and industry, that were totally unknown a 
generation ago. . .. In short, for the first time in history we stand 
on the threshold of a post-scarcity society.65 
Thus, in these two ways, by revising Marx's concept of the origins of human 
self-conscious history and by rejecting communism, Bookchin establishes his acceptance 
of a material-historic dialectic in history, while rej ecting an understanding of dialectics 
based on material relations of production. Recall that for Marx, the first stage of the 
dialectic is an immediate human/nature unity in which human activity is characterized by 
animal-like, survival level activities of the human species. The movement in the second 
stage, in which humans perceive themselves in opposition to nature, is a result of the 
process of self-conscious objectification and the social activity of production. This 
activity yields the third stage, communism, a self-conscious unity of humanity and nature. 
ln contrast, Bookchin's dialectical stages progress due to the activity of consciousness, 
not the activity of labor. Bookchin ' s first stage is one of human/nature immediately 
unity, which includes a basic human social consciousness in the form of communal 
., Bookchin, Murray, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Op. Cit., p. I 0. 
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ethical sensibility - a consciousness that has historically evolved from non-human 
nature. Bookchin's second stage is marked by the evolution of abstract consciousness, as 
evidenced through the rise of abstract society (institutions) and the perception of 
human/nature opposition. Bookchin's third stage is characterized by the synthetic unity 
of (or overcoming of the opposition between) ethical sensibility and abstract reason, 
leading to the emergence of ethical institutions in a society that recognizes itself as 
natural and therefore self-consciously harmonizes itself with nature. 
If society66 isn't realizing the benefits of material wealth for the purpose of freeing 
humanity and nature from social oppression, then what is holding society back from the 
historic dialectical transition into Marx's third stage of synthetic unity? 
What we crucially lack is the consciousness and sensibility that 
will help us achieve such eminently desirable goals - a conscious-
ness and sensibility far broader than customarily meant by these 
terms.67 
For Bookchin, the transition to a harmonious "post-scarcity society" requires the unity of 
two opposing aspects (sensibility and consciousness) of the evolving naturo-social 
dialectic of consciousness. Society already has the material means to change, so now all 
it needs is the "consciousness and sensibility" to change. Marx's understanding of the 
culmination of the dialectic through the production of the material means for overcoming 
need in society is wrong. Bookchin, therefore, asserts that the dialectic which will 
66 
"Society" here refers to capitalist society. Bookchin does offer a critique of Soviet 
economies as well; however, this discussion is not taken up here. 
67 Bookchin, Murray, The Ecology of Freedom, Op. Cit., p. 19. Also, in Post-Scarcity 
Anarchism, an earlier version of this concept is described in psychological terms. For 
example: "[T]here is nothing more oppressive than "privilege" today, for the deepest 
recesses of the "privileged" man's psyche are fair game for exploitation and domination." 
Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Op. Cit. , pp. 11 -12. 
.... 
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culminate in a hannony between human society and nature, and which will overcome the 
human dominance of other humans through hierarchical social institutions, is not one that 
centers on human productive activity, but one that emphasizes nature ' s activity of 
self-consciousness, expressed in an opposition between human social consciousness 
(abstract thought) and natural sensibility (ethical sentiment). For Bookchin, 
understanding the natural activity of the mind, and the opposition within human 
consciousness, is key to understanding the overcoming contemporary oppression." 
Although Bookchin's central concern is with the human ability to conceive of a 
different type of society (and take action accordingly), he does not reject the materialism 
of Marx's reconception of empiricism. Recall that Marx pronounces the premises from 
which philosophy begins to be social facts, based on living human beings and their 
interactions with material conditions of life. In this way, he asserts the materiality of his 
conception of consciousness, and Bookchin does not disagree. Bookchin's understanding 
of the coming social transformation, while not based on the historic role of the proletariat, 
is not, like Hegel's understanding of consciousness in history, grounded in an abstract 
notion or religious conception of the dialectic of mind. The conflict between a 
dominating, rational society and the idea of a harmonious, ethical society is based on a 
real conflict of consciousness as manifested in society. 
Running through the nightmare of domination [of both human 
beings and nature within a hierarchical society J is the vision of 
68 This critique of capitalist society as lacking in the social consciousness required to 
overcome oppression is also levelled against communist societies: "Marx's vision 
notwithstanding, what tends to 'wither away' after this kind of 'revolution ' is not the state 
but the very consciousness of domination." Bookchin, Murray, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, 
Op. Cit. , p. 13 . 
freedom, the repressed intuition that what-is could be otherwise if 
abundance were used for human ends. 69 
Let there be no mistaken notion that this tension [between 
"what-is" and "what-could-be"] floats in some vague fashion 
between theoretical abstractions. The tension is real, and it finds 
daily expression in the lives ofmillions.70 
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Thus, Bookchin accepts a material dialectic" in history, but one that is based on changes 
in human consciousness in addition to the direction of human physical activity. 
Furthermore, Bookchin's central dialectic is one of a material or natural consciousness 
that has ethical/intuitive and analytical/abstract components. Recall that for Marx, the 
first dialectical stage, that of immediate human/nature unity, contains the seeds of the 
opposition in the particular trait of suffering - a trait that emerges prior to human 
self-conscious activity. The second stage, characterized by self-conscious material 
activity (objectification), emerged from the first to yield the perception of a human/nature 
opposition. The third stage is reached through labor, which in the second stage starts and 
finishes the task self-consciously integrating humanity with nature. Thus, for Marx, the 
second stage conflict between man and nature dissolves into a self-conscious synthetic 
unity. For Bookchin, the first stage of the dialectic, that of immediate human/nature 
unity, is characterized by one aspect of the dialectical conflict that emerges in stage two: 
stage one is characterized by human consciousness (as the 'sensibility' of peoples in 
69 Ibid., p. 12. 
10 Ibid., p. 14. 
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" Indeed, how should we think out these questions: By means 
of conventional logic? Intuition? Divine inspiration? Or, perhaps, 
by developmental ways of thinking that are called 'dialectical?'" 
Bookchin, Murray, Remaking Society, Op. Cit., p. 17. 
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organic society) with nature. The second stage of the dialectic is characterized by the 
development of abstract human consciousness (and social institutionsn) that opposes the 
ethical sensibility of humanity toward nature. Thus, for Bookchin, the resolution of the 
dialectical conflict in the third stage is not a synthesis of the material conflict of stage two 
human/nature opposition (as it is for Marx). Rather it is a resolution of the conflict 
between stage one ("what-could-be," as it was in the past) and stage two ("what-is") 
consciousness. In these ways, Bookchin broadens the scope of Marx's dialectic, 
grappling with the issue of "consciousness," which Marx left relatively unexplored other 
than as a key aspect of productive activity. 
2. Bookchin's concept of the development of human consciousness from nature 
Bookchin rethinks the connections between human society and nature to explain how 
human consciousness evolves from nature. This section illuminates what Bookchin takes 
to be the physical relationship between society and nature, in the form of links between 
human sensibility and human behaviors that are rooted in nature. It reviews how the 
dialectical process (a 3-stage development from original unity, to opposition, and finally 
to reconciliation or synthetic unity) is manifested through the development of human 
consciousness in society. Differences between Bookchin's and Marx's conception of the 
historical dialectical development of consciousness in nature are highlighted. This 
" These institutions happen to be hierarchical institutions of domination. Although 
Bookchin traces their development, he cannot (and admits that he cannot) really explain 
why this occurred. The occurrence of the development of these institutions which 
dominate nature, however, justifies the dialectical interpretation of history. "Whether this 
long and tortuous development could have followed a different, more benign, course is 
not irrelevant." Bookchin, Murray, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Op. Cit. , p. l 0. 
... 
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section also reviews Bookchin's idea that the existence of a natural social consciousness 
in humanity occurs through the process of evo lution. 
Next, it demonstrates that Bookchin understands the natural social consciousness, or 
sensibility, of early "organic societies" to be the first stage of the dialectical development 
of human consciousness. Sensibility represents the original unity of an ethical 
consciousness with nature in human organic societies . Bookchin ' s approach is 
demonstrated to be an extension of Marx's attempt to ground Hegel ' s dialectic in nature 
- one in which the origins of the activity of consciousness are materially explained, and 
like Marx's understanding of labor, develop into antithetical components with the 
beginning of the application of abstract thought in society. In conclusion, it will be 
demonstrated that in his revision of Marx ' s model, Bookchin, like Marx, utilized the 
concept of a teleological end of history, and the implications of this conceptualization 
with regard to the claim for basing the dialectic in nature are noted. 
Bookchin claims that society is natural - that there is no break between nature and 
humanity. In a reversal of Marx's attitude toward social production, Bookchin perceives 
nature not as passive with regard to the human creation of social reality, but as an active 
partner. 
What, after all, is human society when we try to view it from 
an ecological perspective? A "curse?" An unmitigated "blessing?" 
A "device" for coping with material needs? Or, dare I say, a 
product of natural evolution as well as culture that not only meets a 
wide variety of human needs, but, potentially at least, can play a 
major role in fostering the evolution of li fe on the planet?" 
More succinctly, 
73 !bid., p. 17 . 
When we begin to consider socialization from an in-depth viewpoint, 
what strikes us is that society itself in its most primal form stems very 
much from nature. Every social evolution, in fact, is virtually an extension 
of natural evolution into a distinctly human realm. 74 
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Contrast Bookchin 's position with Marx's claims about the human-nature 
relationship. Marx clearly thought that humanity was responsible for its own 
development, as well as that of nature - in the sense that nature becomes more than 
physically unified with humanity because of human efforts to express itself through the 
manipulation of nature, thus giving nature ' intrinsic' value. For Marx, consciousness is 
only part of 'humanized nature' because of humanity's labor. Humanity is the focal point 
for Marx's philosophy, and so Marx's analysis of nature does not proceed beyond 
nature's relationship to humanity. For Bookchin, on the other hand, humanity neither 
creates its social self nor creates a ' humanized nature' strictly through its own efforts. 
Both stage one communities (and ethical sensibil ity) and stage two societies (and abstract 
consciousness) are products of the evolution of consciousness in nature into the particular 
form of human consciousness. 
To support this claim, Bookchin relies upon anthropological studies of pre-literate, 
pre-hierarchical communities, which show that the "early social sensibilities" were 
internally related to nature. 75 Notions of equality, kinship and usufruct (the individually 
free choice to use community resources) demonstrated that primitive social communities, 
like natural systems and animal communities, displayed an ethic and social structure that 
mirrors nature itself. Prior to the rise of artificial hierarchies and abstract rules, human 
74 Ibid., p. 25. 
75 Bookchin, Murray, The Ecology of Freedom, Op. Cit., p. 44. 
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social ties and values, like bonds and ritual behaviors in animal communities, were based 
on blood and birth. For example, members of early human societies, like the rest of 
nature, exercised their right to take from the rest of nature what they needed for 
immediate use or seasonal survival. 
In a description of Hopi ceremonial dances, Bookchin draws the conclusion that early 
communities' displays of unity with the rest of nature reveal the fact that human beings, 
and their entire culture, physically emerge from a continuous natural evolution. Human 
social activity has a genetic or "blood" link to the animal community. 
Hence, the very notion of nature is always social at this point 
in human development - in an ontological sense that the proto-
plasm of humankind retains an abiding continuity with the 
protoplasm of nature .... The dancers who imitate animals in their 
gestures or birds in their calls are engaged in more than mere 
mimesis; they form a communal and choral unity with nature, a 
unity that edges into the intimate intercourse of sexuality, birth and 
the interchange ofblood.76 
Here, Bookchin indicates that the "protoplasm of nature" forms an ontological basis for 
human reality. The physical unity with nature, through which the dialectic of 
development emerges, is expressed in our very being. Through human intercourse and 
sexual reproduction, humanity' s physical heritage, like the physical heritage of the animal 
kingdom, emerges from the same genetic and evolutionary processes in nature. 
However, the physical unity of these early organic communities with nature also 
reveals that the physical link between society and nature is associated with the 
socialization process of the young, a process which is also demonstrated throughout the 
animal world. In this way, Bookchin extends Marx's understanding of nature as the 
76 Ibid., 48. 
--
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foundation for physical human reality by regarding nature at stage one (rather than 
production at stage two) as the foundation for human self-conscious, communal/social 
reality. Furthermore, by replacing the activity of human production with the activities of 
human "sensibility" and abstract consciousness, Bookchin simultaneously shifts the focus 
of social value from an economic understanding based on productive labor to an ethical 
understanding based on a natural socialization process. At the same time, Bookchin splits 
the conscious and ethical/value-laden activities of Marx's stage two of the dialectic, into 
aspects of two different stages of the dialectical development of consciousness in nature. 
Thus, for Bookchin 's first stage of the dialectic, in contrast to that of Marx, l) human 
communities exist as social realities; and 2) human consciousness exists as a natural 
reality. 
For Bookchin, nature, more than mere physical being, has a conscious existence that, 
in an "abiding continuity," grades into human consciousness. Based on arguments from 
the early twentieth century biologist Robert Briffault77, Bookchin argues that in animals 
there is a kind of socialization that yields a consciousness, or intelligence, which is very 
simi lar to that of the human members of early societies. 
'Throughout the class of mammals, there is a continuous increase 
in the duration of that association [mother and offspring], which is 
the consequence of the prolongation of the period of infantile 
dependence,' a prolongation which Briffault correlates with 
increases in the period of fetal gestation and advances in 
intelligence. . .. it is a decisive presence, not only in the origins of 
77 Murray Bookchin references Briffault's article, "The Evolution of the Human 
Species" in The Making of Man, V. F. Calverton, ed. (New York: Modem Library, 
1931 ), pp. 765-766. See Bookchin, Murray, "Society and Ecology," Remaking Society, 
Op. Cit., pp. 26 -27. 
society over ages of animal evolution, but in the daily recreation of 
society in our everyday lives.78 
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Thus human socialization, including intelligence and the ethics of caring for members of 
the community and society, is grounded in the emotionally rich experiences of infant 
nurturing. In tum, fetal gestation and infant nurturing are social, conscious and ethical 
traits which exist throughout the mammalian class, emerging from nature and, more 
specifically, from female biology. 79 
According to Bookchin, the role of nature as the biological source for all aspects of 
human development and culture operates independently of the self-conscious, intentional 
activity of human beings. This is a reversal of Marx's position on human-nature 
relations, in which human society imprints itself on nature, and not vice versa. Most 
importantly, while Marx regards contemplation about the origins of consciousness as 
speculative, Bookchin claims to have understood the material/natural origins of human 
consciousness. 
In the sense of operating independently from human consciousness, the 
developmental consciousness of nature, or "reason" (in the sense of encompassing both 
abstract and sensible aspects of consciousness), is a process governed by an abstract 
(historical-dialectical) concept. However, "reason," as the advanced development of 
78 Ibid. , pp. 27. 
79 Thus, the overcoming of sexism plays a critical role in the overcoming of all ' isms' in 
hierarchical society, as women are naturally in closer touch with the "repressed intuition" 
of the victims of capitalist and communist societies. "Hence the revolutionary core of 
the women 's liberation movement, which has brought the very syntax and musculature of 
domination into public view. [sic. ] In so doing, the movement has brought everyday life 
itself, not just abstractions like ' Society,' 'Class,' and 'Proletariat,' into question." 
Bookchin, Murray, Post-Scarcity Anarchism , Op. Cit., p. 18. 
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sensibility and analytical thinking in Bookchin's stage two of the dialectic, occurs only in 
human beings; likewise, human beings possess the ability to reason (ethically and 
analytically) through their physical link to nature. 
Reason, as I have emphasized, has its own natural and social 
history that provides a better means of resolving its paradoxes than 
does a strictly intellectual strategy .... The formation of the human 
mind is inseparable from the socialization of human nature at birth 
and its early period of development."80 
Thus, Bookchin views "reason" as non-abstract on the basis of both human socialization 
and the physical bond with nature through reproduction. Furthermore, "reason" is 
understood as part of nature, and bears the same physical (naturalist) relationship to 
human beings that Marx described for the inorganic aspect of nature. Humanity is part of 
reason and inorganic nature for Bookchin, and likewise, reason and inorganic nature are 
part of humanity. 
Bookchin understands the third stage of the dialectic, or the resolution (or higher 
unity) of the historical dialectic of reason, as the goal of Western philosophy. The aim of 
social human consciousness is the unity of an ethical unity with nature and the analytical 
control of(or ability to manage) nature. 
80 
" 
The melding of an organic, process-oriented outlook with an 
analytical one has been the traditional goal of classical western 
philosophy from the pre-Socratics to Hegel. Such a philosophy has 
always been more than an outlook or method for dealing with 
reality. It has also been what philosophers call an ontology - a 
description of reality conceived not as mere matter, but as active, 
self-organizing substance with a striving toward consciousness." 
Bookchin, Murray, The Ecology of Freedom, Op. Cit., p. 304. 
Ibid., p. 14. 
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Here, Bookchin clearly identifies himself with a classic Western philosophic idealism. 
The goal , an enlightened return to an original unity with nature, is one that Marx also 
shared. Bookchin ' s ontological orientation, however, unlike Marx 's, cannot be said to be 
"humanist." Humanity, for Bookchin, becomes an expression of what material nature is 
stri ving toward. ln a Hegelian-like twist, Bookchin contends that consciousness, the 
teleological end of nature, is self-creating and humanity is its highest expression. 
Humans are at the apex of the goal of self-consciousness toward which nature tends: "we 
are the very ' knowingness ' of nature, the embodiment of nature' s evolution into intellect, 
mind and self-reflexivity."" 
So, the ' striving toward consciousness,' or the natural tendency of matter toward 
self-consciousness is, for Bookchin, a general description of nature, within which human 
beings are situated and are understood as the end result, the culmination, of the history of 
the consciousness of nature. 
Conclusion: In conclusion, Bookchin makes an argument for the naturalness of 
consciousness (as an ethical sensibility and as abstract reason) and in this way extends 
Marx ' s idea of the physical unity between humanity and nature into the area of reasoning 
capacity and consciousness. It has been demonstrated that Bookchin reworks a historical 
dialectic in a manner that, like Marx, relies on nature, rather than an ideal or religious 
principle, as the source of conflict in society. Furthermore, he defends the idea that there 
is an intuitive aspect to ethics, and that the there is a parallel between what one can 
speculate to be the experience of human members of ' early organic societies' and the 
82 Ibid., p. 38. 
---
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behavioral aspects that human kind shares with the animal kingdom. Bookchin's tum to 
nature as a source for ethics does expand the discussion of value, understood within 
Marx's historical-material dialectic, namely as an economic concept. 
Bookchin 's approach is not as overtly "humanist" as is Marx's approach, in which 
humans are the only active parties in social development. Bookchin, on the other hand, 
regards the main dialectic to be a natural one, which plays itself out in nature and 
humanity. Marx, by contrast, regards the main dialectic to be a human one which plays 
itself out in nature and humanity. This difference in emphasis is also characteristic of 
Warren and Naess, who, like Bookchin, are concerned with the ecological threat to nature 
as a result of advanced socio-economic development - a concern which was not shared 
by Marx, who regarded such development as a necessary stage in the progress to 
harmony, a progression which Bookchin argues has not occurred. 
Bookchin remains closely tied to Marxism, in that the turn toward nature as the 
ground for philosophy results in the development of an analysis which relies heavily on 
anthropological, historical, social and scientific detail to support its claims. However, 
both philosophers claim that there is only one correct interpretation of history. The belief 
in the dialectic of history, as the only correct theoretical viewpoint, does not 
accommodate the notion of "diversity," which is a significant part of the ecological 
outlook. Warren and Naess, like Bookchin, tum to nature as a base for philosophy and 
for an ethical approach to nature; however, unlike Marx and Bookchin, their philosophies 
attempt to allow for a diversity of theoretical viewpoints. 
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CHAPTER 3: WARREN: A PLURALIST ECOFEMINISM 
Karen Warren brings an environmental perspective to feminist philosophy (and a 
feminist perspective to environmental philosophy). The main purpose of her writings is 
to establish a theoretically adequate base for ecofeminism" . Central to Warren's 
ecofeminism is the relation between human and non-human nature, as well the 
transformation of feminism so that feminism is reconceptualized to mean "a movement to 
end all systems of oppression,"" including the human domination of non-human nature. 
This chapter focuses on 1) the centrality of pluralism to Warren ' s definition of 
ecofeminism; and 2) Warren's critique of other feminist theories with regard to their 
defensibility for supporting Warren ' s view of nature. In both areas of focus, the 
relationship of Warren's positions to Marx ' s "humanist/naturalist" approach is 
demonstrated. The purpose of this chapter is to show that Warren ' s assertions and claims 
in support of ecofeminism have direct philosophic roots in Marxist theory, and further to 
establish that Warren extends Marx ' s humanist/naturalist approach to philosophy by 
applying his critique of idealism and materialism to theories which exclude 
non-intellectual (i.e. ethical and emotional) aspects of human experience and do not allow 
for experiential diversity. 
This chapter begins with a review of several of Warren's definitions and minimal 
conditions" that outline the boundary between what is and what is not ecofeminism, all 
83 Ecofeminism is a term for ecological feminism, first introduced by Francoise 
de'Eaubonne. See Warren, Karen J., "The Power and the Promise of Ecological 
Feminism," Environmental Ethics, Vol. 12 (Summer 1990), p. 125-126. 
84 Warren, Karen J. , "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Environmental 
Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1981, p. 18. 
" Ibid., pp. 18-20. See also "The Power & Promise of Ecological Feminism," Op. Cit., 
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of which center on women-nature connections from the perspective of a transformative, 
pluralist feminism . It will be demonstrated that the assumptions underlying 
ecofeminism's pluralism owe a debt to Marx, especially to Marx 's humanist orientation. 
Warren ' s focus is on experience of being human, especially with being female, with the 
resultant emphasis on the particular and human experience as the foundation for 
abstractions and generalizations. 
This chapter also reviews Warren's critical examination of the liberal, Marxist, 
radical and socialist feminist perspectives on human/nature relations, concluding with a 
brief summary of a new set of "transformative" feminist minimum conditions that reflect 
ecofeminist criticisms of the four other versions of feminism." Warren presents very 
little information on her view of nature, but rather critiques other views on nature in order 
to define the boundaries of ecofeminist conceptions of nature. Despite her ecofeminist 
reliance on historical-materialism" and on Marx's critique of traditional Western 
philosophy, Warren arrives at a position which accepts pluralism (within limits), thus 
deviating from Marx's (and Bookchin ' s) practice of arriving at one grand, theoretical 
synthesis to explain the human experience of reality and human-nature relations. 
pp. 139-143 and "Toward an Ecofeminist Peace Politics," Ecological Feminism, edited 
by Karen J. Warren (Routledge: New York, 1994) pp. 187-189. 
86 
"[W]hat is needed is a new 'transformative' feminism, one which moves us beyond 
the current debate over the four leading versions of feminism and make an eco-feminist 
perspective central to feminist theory and practice." Ibid. , p.5. 
87 Warren indicates support of dialectical materialism in two ways. One is through two 
of the four "minimal boundary conditions" ofecofeminism. A second is through her 
assumption of progress in history and the need for a universal transformation of a basic 
conflict in society between the victims of sexist-naturist oppression and the oppressors. 
This aspect of her philosophy is not discussed in this chapter. 
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1. Definitions of Ecofeminism - From its inception, Warren's definition of the tenn 
'eco-feminism' has allowed for a variety of theoretical positions stressing the importance 
of women-nature connections to be grouped under the same heading. Warren's theoreti-
cal approach is very similar to Marx's. Marx attempts to explore the complexities of, and 
to base his theories strictly on, particular facts and concrete human experience. Marx 
recognizes that theory is a particular expression of the real connections experienced by 
different individuals (or groups) in different social circumstances. Marx 's theory is 
restricted to an analysis of the experience of capitalists and proletarians, while Warren's 
eco-feminism incorporates the theoretical exploration of real connections experienced by 
many different individuals and groups. Warren's view, however, does not attempt to unite 
these diverse theoretical perspectives into one all-encompassing theoretical framework. 
In a 1987 article entitled "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Warren 
identifies ecofeminists simply as feminists who agree that there are "important 
connections between the oppression of women and the oppression of nature" [referring to 
"the domination or subordination of nonhuman nature by humans"]." What distinguishes 
ecofeminists from other feminists involved in the ecology debate is their conviction that 
an understanding of the connections between the oppression of women and the 
oppression of nature is "'potentially liberating. "'89 These characteristics specifically 
delineate ecofeminism and fonn the first two of four basic claims identified by Warren as 
serving as "a minimum condition account of eco-feminism:" 
88 Warren, Karen J., "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Op. Cit., p. 4. 
89 Ibid., p. 4. 
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[E]co-feminism is a position based on the following claims: (i) there are important 
connections between the oppression of women and the oppression of nature; (ii) 
understanding the nature of these connections is necessary to any adequate understanding 
of the oppression of women and the oppression of nature .. .. 90 
For ecofeminists, the study of women-nature connections is desirable for a variety of 
reasons, such as its potential to transform world views and to inspire the creation of 
alternative value systems. In further developing this working definition, Warren provides 
no specific theory of the connections between the oppression of women and that of 
nature; she does this for a variety of reasons, including allowing ecofeminism to embrace 
positions which are based on competing feminist theories. The extent of differences 
among them encompasses a full range of philosophic reflections. 
The varieties of ecofeminism reflect not only differences in the 
analysis of the woman/nature connection, but also differences on 
such fundamental issues as the nature of and solutions to women 's 
oppression, the theory of human nature, and the conceptions of 
freedom, equality, and epistemology . .. .91 
The remaining two boundary conditions formalize Warren 's conviction that 
women-nature connections are of central importance to the overcoming of all oppress-
ions, and therefore are necessary for any movement opposing oppression, especially the 
feminist and ecology movements, to achieve their respective goals. Claims (iii) and (iv) 
specify the mutual requirement of feminism to be ecological and ecology to be feminist: 
"(iii) feminist theory and practice must include an ecological perspective; and (iv) 
solutions to ecological problems must include a feminist perspective. "92 Through her 
90 Ibid. , p. 4-5. Claims (iii) and (iv) concern the mutual requirement of feminism to be 
ecological and ecology to be feminist. 
" Ibid. , p. 4. 
92 Ibid. , p. 4-5. 
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refinement of the definition of ecofeminism and her review of the inadequacies of 
non-ecofeminist feminism, Warren articulates a second set of boundary conditions that 
centralizes the importance of women-nature connections and can be applied to all 
feminist perspectives. Both her definition of ecofeminism and her second set of boundary 
conditions (for transformative feminism) emphasize diversity and social context (which 
in ecofeminist boundary condition (iv) is limited to the context concerning "ecological 
problems"). 
A distinctive feature of Warren ' s ecophilosophic work has been her consistent effort 
to define a conceptual and minimal framework for ecofeminism, one which will serve as 
a basis for the continued development of a theoretical model that includes the voices of 
diverse women. These voices differ in their mode of expression; that is, these viewpoints 
are not only analytical, but incorporate other aspects of conscious experience. They 
include artistic, conceptual, personal, and spiritual viewpoints. Also, differences in local 
cultures across the globe have produced different histories of women over time. 
Warren's concern for diversity, which qualifies her initial definition of the term 
' ecofeminism,' becomes a component of her formal definition of ecofeminism in the 
1990 article, "The Power & Promise of Ecological Feminism." There, Warren defines 
' ecofeminism' as " the position that there are important connections - historical, 
experiential, symbolic, theoretical - between the domination of women and the 
domination ofnature."93 This change reflects the centrality of her tolerance for a 
93 Warren, Karen J., "Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism," Op. Cit., p. 125. 
See also Warren, Karen J. , "Introduction," Ecological Feminism, Op. Cit., p. I. for 
expanded list, including empirical , religious, literary, political, epistemological, etc. 
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multiplicity of views concerning woman-nature connections, so much so that multiplicity 
is built into her definition of ' ecofeminism.' 
By 1994, Warren expounds the definition of 'ecofeminism' in the following way. 
[A]n umbrella term which captures a variety of multicultural 
perspectives on the nature of the connections within social systems 
of domination between those humans in subdominant or 
subordinate positions, particularly women, and the domination of 
nonhuman nature.94 
The use of terms such as ' umbrella,' 'variety' and 'multicultural' captures the diversity 
aspect which qualifies the above definitions. This most recent expanded definition of 
ecofeminism continues to recognize the importance of human/nature connections, but it 
also contains a direct reference to the social context in which human connections occur, 
beyond the limits of so lving ecological problems. Human connections to nature, as the 
above quote demonstrates, parallel the social relations between groups of humans. As is 
the case with Marx , human to non-human nature relations match the level of human 
social development. Warren, however, does not base her judgment on property relations, 
but rather on relations of domination. 
The multi-cultural, social context approach to ecofeminism reflects both a Marxist 
and feminist heritage. First, the reference to social settings as 'social systems of 
dominance,' coupled with the exclusive focus on the perspectives of dominated humans, 
is indicative of a strong affiliation with historical materialism and/or social ecology95 -
94 Karen J. Warren, "Introduction," Ecological Feminism, Op. Cit., p. 1. 
95 Warren states that ecofeminism "is a social ecology. It recognizes the twin 
dominations of women and nature as social problems rooted both in the very concrete, 
historical, socioeconomic circumstances and in oppressive patriarchal conceptual 
frameworks which maintain and sanction these circumstances," "The Power and the 
Promise of Ecological Feminism," Op. Cit., p. 143. 
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which as shown in Chapter 2 is a development based on a revision of the Marxist model. 
Second, the multi-cultural/diversity aspect of Warren's definition ofecofeminism, as well 
as the centrality of women 's oppression "within social systems of domination," is based 
on an explicitly feminist perspective. 
2. Social context of domination - Warren ' s incorporation of socialist feminism into 
ecofeminism expands the pluralism of ecofeminist perspectives. Eco feminism not only 
encompasses the women's-voice perspective, but includes the perspectives of men who 
share subordinate status in the Western patriarchal cultural hierarchy via their class, race, 
sexual preference, ethnic, or other subdominant group affiliation. 
By this inclusion of the oppressed-male perspective, ecofeminism claims that the 
' domination of non-human nature' is socially linked to the systematic domination of any 
oppressed person and to all types of oppression (human and non-human) . This claim 
parallels Marx's claim that society's transition to communism will resolve all conflicts 
"between man and nature and between man and man" because the process of the 
objectification of humanity in nature (property, under capitalism) is a social process 
impacting all human/nature relations.96 This aspect of inclusiveness, therefore, is a 
generali zation of ecofeminism in terms of its universal applicability. So, while diversity 
allows for expanding the theoretical basis of ecofeminism to all groups, the particular 
perspective of a diverse ecofeminism is extended to all oppressed groups. The exclusion 
of the viewpoint of the oppressors represents the boundary of, or limits to, Warren's 
theoretical diversity. In this respect, ecofeminism, like Marxism, generalizes its 
96 See Chapter One, page 20 and 26-27. 
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conceptual framework {which accommodates a diversity of theories) across one side of 
the social conflict. 
Further, Warren highlights the individual and unique perspective of ' those humans in 
subdominant or subordinate positions,' so that their particular views are included among 
the various possible conceptual viewpoints on the connections between human and 
non-human oppression. The approach to understanding the individual from the 
perspective of his/her social context, which Marx asserts is the only method of 
understanding humanity, is also taken by Warren. While Marx approaches individual 
experience as particular social facts which emerge in a particular context of social 
production, and are thus fit into a unified theoretical context, Warren shares the feminist 
perspective that celebrates differences in circumstances and viewpoints {that are not 
economic or class based). Feminism and ecofeminism posit these different views and 
experiences in a framework which delineates a variety of theoretical perspectives and 
even attempts to incorporate the unique and non-generalizable voice.97 Warren expresses 
this view in a discussion of theory building, focusing on ethical concerns. "When a 
multiplicity of cross-cultural voices are (sic.) centralized, narrative is able to give expres-
sion to a range of attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviors which may be overlooked or 
silenced by imposed ethical meaning and theory." 98 
97 
"From a feminist point of view, impartiality ... involves being sure that the felt 
experience of women, however diverse those experiences may be, are part of theory 
building." Warren, Karen J., "Critical Thinking and Feminism," Informal Logic, X.I, 
Winter 1988, p. 39. 
98 Warren, Karen J., "The Power & The Promise of Ecological Feminism," Op. Cit., p. 
136. 
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3. Feminist context of oppression - From a feminist perspective, multi-
cultural/diversity and the centrality of women's oppression "within social systems of 
domination" are explicitly linked themes. However, Warren's particular feminist 
perspective is based on I) socialist feminist theory, with its explicit debt to Marx and 
Marxism; and 2) the critique of the patriarchal conceptual framework, with its explicit 
foundation "in familiar ecological principles,',.. and implicit parallels to Marxist theory. 
Before continuing to compare and contrast aspects of the environmental philosophy of 
Karen Warren with the philosophy of Karl Marx, it is important to note that Warren's 
position draws heavily on feminist conceptions which are not present in Marx. Marx did 
not engage in gender-based analysis to overcome male-bias, nor did he privilege women 
as key to the humanist transformation of nature or to the synthesis of natural intuition. 
He merely noted that the closest natural human relation is the male-female relation; and 
that therefore the social institutions governing the relation of women to men bear a direct 
relation to (or are indicative of) the general level of society's objective relation to both 
human and non-nature. However, many of the criticisms which Marx leveled against the 
capitalist system, idealism and abstract materialism are similar to Warren's criticisms of 
patriarchy and of the theoretical foundations of the four leading schools of feminism. 
4. Four Schools of Feminist Thought on Nature - In "Feminism and Ecology: 
Making Connections," Warren posits ecofeminism within the "feminist debate over 
99 Warrens claims that the "critique of patriarchal conceptual frameworks [a critique 
which is "central" to the ecofeminist project] is grounded in familiar ecological 
principles: everything is interconnected with everything else; ... healthy, balanced 
ecosystems must maintain diversity; there is unity in diversity." (emphasis mine). 
"Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Op. Cit., p. 7. 
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ecology," a debate reflective of four schools of feminist thought: liberal, traditional 
Marxist, radical and socialist feminism. Warren claims that "just as there is not one 
version of feminism, there is not one version of ecofeminism." 100 This claim, however, is 
not meant to indicate an ecofeminist acceptance of the ecological implications of these 
different versions of feminism. As will be indicated by the nature of Warren's ecofem-
inist criticisms of the main branches of feminist thought, Warren ' s arguments supporting 
multi-culturalism/diversity and the social context of women ' s experience display a debt 
to Marx ' s naturalist approach. Marx prioritizes the particular, historical-individual 
experience as the foundation of theory, rejects idealism as the foundation of theory, and 
claims that the understanding of human experience and the development of theory cannot 
be separated from the social context within which they occur. 
(i) 
Liberal feminism. This section demonstrates that Warren ' s critique of liberalism, 
which has a foundation of "extreme individualism" '0 ' (based on an abstract, ahistorical 
conception of human beings) and corresponding individualistic and rational-based 
outlook, relies upon Marx's critique of abstract materialism. 
The ecological implications of liberal individualism, with its emphasis on reason as 
the essential activity of humanity, conflict with ecofeminism' s emphasis on "the 
independent value of the integrity, diversity, and stability of ecosystems" and the "equal 
value to all parts of the human-nature system." 102 Ecofeminism, given the ecological 
100 Ibid. , p. 4. 
101 Ibid., p. 10. 
102 Ibid., p. 10. For underlying premise of the claim for "equal value ... " (i .e., the priority 
given to relations, rather than to relators as moral agents, within the human-nature 
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implications to which Warren refers, focuses on values. Unlike Marx's neglect of ethical 
values, ecofeminism makes ethical opposition to the moral value system associated with 
the patriarchal conceptual frarnework 103 an important aspect of its theory. Warren argues 
that liberal feminist ethics, i.e. individual-rights based ethics, is an inadequate base for 
ecofeminist ethics because it draws on "hierarchical rights- and rules-based ethical 
models." These models are based only on the perspective of the dominant members of 
society, and thus conceal the moral viewpoint of subordinate groups, i.e. women whose 
social circumstances differ greatly from those of the dominant male group. The 
"extreme," or abstract, individualistic ethics of liberalism does not consider the social 
context of the individual, which is a main component of Warren's definition of 
ecofeminism. The individual is understood as a rational being, whose thought is eternally 
valid regardless of the socio-material conditions (class, sex/sexual orientation, ethnicity, 
etc.) within which individuals exist. Furthermore, what is rational is I) defined by 
members at the top of a dominating, hierarchical social structure; and, 2) obscured under 
the guise of universalism, as it appears in the particular ruling class, male-based bias in 
liberal ethics. Warren draws on feminist scholarship for examples of why ecofeminists 
should be "suspicious of approaches to feminism, ethics, or ecological concerns based on 
a patriarchal conceptual frarnework." 104 Warren utilizes arguments made by philosopher 
Kathryn Pyne Addelson to link the ecofeminist critique of traditional ethics to the 
system), see Warren, Karen J. , "The Power and the Promise," Op. Cit. , pp. 135-137. 
10
' A study of ecofeminist ethics and its critique of the hierarchical value system of 
patriarchy is not part of this paper, as the subject would require a separate chapter. 
104 Ibid., p. 11. 
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ecofeminist critique of liberal feminism . Citing Addelson, Warren explains that the bias 
in the dominant liberal world view 
'allows moral problems to be defined from the top of various 
hierarchies of authority in such a way that the existence of the 
authority is concealed, and so the existence of alternative defini-
tions that might challenge that authority and radically change our 
social organization is also concealed.' 105 
Although Warren explicitly rejects liberal feminism on the grounds of its acceptance of a 
liberal ethics stemming from the ' patriarchal conceptual framework,' her reasoning 
reveals a rejection of arguments based on the idea of an abstract and socially isolated 
individual. This correlates to Marx's rejection of the individualist viewpoint in liberal 
economics. Recall that Marx rejects arguments that are based on "arbitrary" or dogmatic 
abstractions (i .e. , abstractions which are not based on understanding the "real" individual 
as living in a particular, social context) . Furthermore, Marx regards liberal economic 
theory as concealing economic power relations and value, just as Warren regards liberal 
ethical theory as concealing patriarchal power relations and ethical bias. Marx under-
stands that intrinsic value relations are hidden in commodities and in objective human 
relations (those relations which serve as the basis for the objective satisfaction of needs). 
(ii) 
Traditional Marxist feminism. Warren's critique of Marxist feminism reveals that her 
interpretation of Marx incorporates the "early" Marx 's broad-based conception of 
consciousness and emphasis on particular, real, living human beings (rather than class 
consciousness) as the basis for theory. Further, with regard to nature, Warren indicates 
105 Kathryn Pyne Addelson, "Moral Revolution," in Women and Values, p. 306, cited by 
Warren,fbid., p. 10. 
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that although the development of nature and the social status of women have been linked 
in the past, they may not be linked in the future - a possibility which Marx did not 
admit, thus making Warren's identification of nature with social development historically 
contingent and not ontologically united. 
In reviewing traditional Marxist feminism, Warren outlines the basic Marxist insight 
of the "social construction" of knowledge. '06 She clearly indicates that the Marxist social 
conception of knowledge is part ofecofeminist epistemology. Unlike traditional Marxist 
feminists, ecofeminists expand Marxist epistemology to incorporate radical feminist 
epistemology, which includes "felt experiences" as a particular source of knowledge 
based on experiences of the individual in a variety of social contexts. This epistemolog-
ical extension, which echoes Bookchin 's conception of"ethical sensibility," conflicts 
with Marx's relegation of emotional awareness ("suffering") to stage one of the dialectic. 
Recall that for Marx, this natural emotional awareness is not a basis for knowledge. 
Trans formative (ecological) feminist epistemology, by grounding knowledge in 
non-generalizable, personal experiences, "provide[s] a central theoretical place for the 
diversity of women's experiences, even if this means abandoning the project of 
attempting to formulate one over arching feminist theory or one women's voice."107 
Warren summarizes the traditional Marxist feminist definition of human being: they 
understand human nature praxeologically; that is I) as in the process of developing 
historically and socially; and 2) as active beings whose "conscious physical labor [is] 
106 Ibid., p. 12. 
101 Ibid. , p. 18. 
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directed at transforming the material world to meet human needs."'0' Although Warren's 
stress on the importance of historical factors and social context for an ecofeminist 
transformation of the world is compatible with her summation of Marxist feminist 
ontology, she acknowledges that there are key differences with regard to the Marx-Engels 
materialistic view of nature. Warren does not take a position on whether or not 
traditional Marxism can develop a view of nature which does not over-emphasize the 
human objectification of nature and the role of nature in materially satisfying human 
needs. Yet, recall that Marx understood human/nature relations as eventually being 
transformed so that nature is self-consciously recognized as being part of humanity and as 
having value by virtue of being part of humanity. Warren, on the other hand, claims that 
central conceptions within ecofeminism are grounded in ecological principles, such as 
"all parts of an ecosystem have equal value,"109 thus raising the possibility that an 
ecosystem without connection to humanity has value. While Warren cites problematic 
ecological implications of this ontology, she holds open the possibility for a traditional 
Marxist feminist reinterpretation of human relations with nature. 
Indeed, the most "significant" of the ecofeminist challenges to traditional Marxist 
feminism does not directly concern nature relations but is based on their "general failure 
to take seriously gender as a constitutive category of social reality. 11 0 By ignoring gender, 
108 Ibid., p. 12. 
109 See footnote I 00, p. 57 of this text. 
110 Warren, Karen J., "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections, Op. Cit. , p. 13. 
See part (iii), Radical Feminism, of this chapter section for discussion of gender as an 
important category of human experience. 
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traditional Marxist feminists are not placing significance on the particularity of social 
reality (i.e. gender as a personal aspect of human experience.) 
Warren's two other criticisms of traditional Marxist feminism, however, do empha-
size the conflict between humans and nature. First, Warren suggests that traditional 
Marxist feminists need to adjust their "claims about nature with a political vision that 
does not pit men and women, as one class, over and against nature" and does not maintain 
the "patriarchal conceptual framework" which could continue to uphold the exploitation 
of nature "even if women get elevated to equal status with men (but against nature.)"111 
This suggestion implies that the conceptual connections between the domination of 
women and of nature are separable, in that Warren admits of the future possibility that the 
domination of nature could continue, but sexism be abolished. Second, Warren suggests 
that traditional Marxist feminists need to go beyond a negative conception of 
environmental problems as a function of capitalist means and forces of production, to 
develop a positive conception of human/nature relations in which a "liberating or 
appropriate technology and science, based on ecological principles, could help protect 
and preserve, rather than exploit, nature." 112 
(iii) 
Radical feminism . Warren adopts two aspects of radical feminism in clarifying 
ecofeminism, both of which extend Marx's theoretical foundation. First, radical feminist 
ontology emphasizes particular traits, including their laboring activity but most 
111 Ibid., p. 13 . 
"'Warren, Karen J., "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Op. Cit., p. 13 . 
Warren's criticisms here is comparable to Murray Bookchin 's critique of the environmen-
tal degradation in the soviet and socialist economies. 
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importantly their gender, as an important aspect of the individual ' s material body and 
situates individuals within a patriarchy. In a parallel fashion, Marx's ontology 
emphasizes particular (or real-life) activity as an important aspect of the individual's 
material body and situates individuals within a social system of production. Second, it is 
an innovative feature of "radical feminist epistemology [to] self-consciously explore 
strategies (e.g., consciousness-raising processes)""' that challenge the bias toward reason 
as the supreme source of knowledge, a bias that persists in Marx's and Bookchin's 
conception of consciousness.'" By adopting alternative strategies, ecofeminism extends 
Marx 's reason-based, epistemological demand for concrete living proofofk:nowledge to 
include the wisdom of emotions and felt experience as living sources of knowledge in 
concrete circumstances." ' In these two ways, Warren claims, radical feminism makes a 
contribution to ecofeminist theory by furthering the process of overcoming "distortions of 
patriarchal ideology.""' Its positive contributions are incorporated into socialist and 
transformative eco-feminism, both of which "wed the insights of traditional Marxist 
feminism and radical feminism." 117 
113 Ibid., p. 14. 
114 It should be noted that Bookchin does incorporate intuition as the basis for ethical 
sensibility, in his concept of the consciousness of nature. However, he places primary 
importance on analytical thinking as a "higher" type of consciousness, thus subjugating 
his foundation of a natural ethic to the rule of analytical reason, a rule which becomes 
benevolent with the synthesis of these two forms of 'reason.' 
115 It should be noted that radical feminists are not the only philosophers who emphasize 
feelings and intuition. Blaise Pascal, Max Scheler and Arne Naess are examples of male 
philosophers in the minority tradition of Western philosophy who also reject this bias. 
116 Karen J. Warren, "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Op. Cit. , p. 14. 
11 7 !bid. , p. 16. 
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On the negative side, Warren rejects radical feminism 's dualist approach to 
women-nature relations because of its 1) overall lack of attention to, or denial of, 
historical conditions; and 2) mystification of human-nature connections. These, of 
course, are the two faults which, respectively, are part of the philosophical premises of 
19th century materialist and ideali st philosophies, according to Marx in the German 
Ideology. Warren's criticisms of the foundation of radical feminist positions, understood 
in terms of the question '" Aie women closer to nature than men?,"'' 18 reveals the 
similarity between Marx 's critique of idealism and materialism and Warren's critique of 
radical feminism . On the one hand, radical ' nature' feminists affinn women ' s "close 
connections" to nature to encourage a "transforrn[ation of] our spiritual consciousness so 
as to be more in tune with nature."119 On the other hand, other radical feminists deny 
women's special relationship with nature. 
Thus, radical feminist ecology "pays little attention to the historical and material 
features of women's oppression (including the relevance of race, class, ethnic, and 
national background)" and does not ground its analysis in "concrete and diverse social 
structures."120 ln addition, the radical feminist ecological question(' Aie women closer to 
nature than men?') either "mystifies women's experience to locate women closer to 
nature than men" or "underplays important aspects of the oppression of women to deny 
the connection of women with nature." 121 The question, ' Aie women closer to nature than 
men?,' Warren argues, ignores a basic assumption of ecofeminism underlying its 
118 !bid., p. 14. 
119 !bid., p. 14. 
120 !bid., p. 15. 
121 !bid., p. 15 . 
..... 
--
65 
anti-dualism: "the truth is that women, like men, are both connected to nature and 
separate from it, natural and cultural beings.""' In affirming the claim that both men and 
women are connected simultaneously to nature and to culture, Warren implicitly 
acknowledges the basic ontological unity between human beings and nature that Marx 
and Bookchin recognize as essential to the definition of humanity. 
Further, Warren expresses sympathy toward an "understandable" socialist feminist 
guardedness with regard to such dualist arguments concerning "women's spiritual or 
sex-gender-based connection with nature."123 Her claim is that radical feminists ignore the 
facts of feminist scholarship, which have revealed the fallacy of 'nature-culture dualism.' 
Her argument can be seen as compatible with that of traditional Marxist feminism in that 
the "mystifying" of nature experiences is a consequence of not sufficiently grounding 
one's viewpoint on concrete facts, including historical facts. Warren 's criticisms of 
radical feminist ecology are the same as her criticisms of philosophies of essence: Both 
are based on concepts which are ahistorical and mystifying. In "The Power & Promise of 
Ecological Feminism," Warren asserts the ecofeminist "assum[ption) that there is no 
essence (in the sense of some transhistorical, universal, absolute abstraction)."'" 
Her critique of mystifying, ahistorical, philosophies of essence is compatible with 
Marx's two-part critique of mysticism in the German Ideology. It demonstrates accep-
lance of at least two main features of Marx's epistemological theory: I) a demand that 
facts, analyses and abstractions be sufficiently grounded in concrete, socio-historical 
122 Ibid. , p. 15. 
123 Ibid., p. 17. 
'" Warren, Karen J., "The Power & Promise of Ecological Feminism," Op. Cit., p. 
138-139. 
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conditions (inclusive of dominant ideologies) and, consequently, a rejection of facts, 
analyses and abstractions based on transhistorical , ahistorical or idealist assumptions; and 
2) a suspicion that spiritual experiences, while in themselves legitimate, mystify the 
causal historical facts and conceptions which are at the base of given social problems, 
insofar as these experiences give rise to arguments based on 'essence.' 
(iv) 
Socialist feminism. Of the four leading versions of feminism , Warren states that "it 
might seem that it [socialist feminism] would provide the most promising theoretical 
framework for eco-feminist concerns.""' It combines historical materialism with gender 
analysis and studies the connections between economic and sexist social systems of 
oppression, just as ecofeminism is concerned with the systematic social connections 
between the oppression of human and natural systems. Likewise, socialist feminism 
regards the economic and sexist systems as mutually and "dialectically" reinforcing and 
as requiring a joint overcoming of "capitalism" and "patriarchy" in order to secure the 
"liberation ofwomen."126 This corresponds to (iii) and (iv) of Warren's four original 
minimal boundary conditions, in which ecofeminists regard the oppression of women and 
nature as mutually reinforcing and directly linked. The overcoming of sexism requires 
the overcoming of"naturism"J27 (and vice versa). The only criticism Warren directs at 
socialist feminism is its lack of incorporation of "naturism" as a systematic oppression 
125 Warren, Karen J., "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Op. Cit., pp. 
16-17. 
126 Ibid., p. 16. 
127 Naturism is defined by Warren as "the domination or oppression of nature," in 
Warren, Kareen J., "The Power & Promise of Ecological Feminism," Op. Cit., p. 32. 
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linked to all the other social oppressions, (i.e., classism, racism, sexism, imperialism, 
etc.). 
After reviewing and critiquing the four major schools of feminist thought, Warren 
offers six new boundary conditions as "suggestions about how such a transformative 
feminism might be developed" in the future. Her debt to Marxism is clearly indicated by 
the fact that four of these conditions of a future transformative feminism are attributable 
to socialist feminist theory. They are I) the understanding of"structural 
interconnections" between various forms of oppression, such that ecofeminism can 
become a "movement to end all forms of oppression; 2) the social and experiential 
concept of knowledge, such that ecofeminist politics "asserts the value and specificity of 
group difference in political theory and practice;" 3) the emphasis on the interplay of 
human and nonhuman connections concerning our ontological conceptions of human 
beings and our conceptual frameworks; and 4) technological research, technology and 
science applications need to be used in ways that are non-oppressive.128 The remaining 
two suggested boundary conditions for transformative feminism stem directly from the 
feminist critique of the patriarchal conceptual framework , 129 and are not attributable to a 
link with the philosophy of Karl Marx. 
Conclusion: Much of what is distinctly 'ecofeminist' in Warren's analysis is based 
on an extension or reinterpretation of Marx's understanding of human-nature relations: 
128 Warren, Karen J. , "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Op. Cit., pp. 
18-20. 
129 The specific concerns raised in the remaining two 'suggestions' concern the 
ecofeminist critique of patriarchy as it relates to the ' logic of domination' and ethics, two 
areas of concern which, as Bookchin noted, were sorely lacking in Marxist-Leninist 
inspired philosophy. 
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1) a focus on the priority of human beings in a specific context as the basis of theory that 
includes 'felt,' as well as ' reasoned' experiences; 2) acceptance of an all encompassing 
dialectic, but the pluralistic rejection of devising a grand theory, a rejection made on the 
basis of upholding respect for the variety of 'reasoned' perspectives legitimately 
developed by individuals; and 3) an expansion of Marx's idea that the level of social 
development in society (with respect to overcoming class domination) is directly linked 
to the relationship between human and non-human nature, adding the overcoming of 
sexism, racism and naturism as part of the dialectical transition of society. 
Like Bookchin, Warren relies heavily on Marx 's socio-historical analysis to 
comprehend human/nature relations. Furthermore, she incorporates the 'feeling' or 
personal aspects of human experience into the foundation of theory-building, so that an 
intuitive and experience-based ethic can be incorporated with "material conditions" to 
form a concrete basis for new understanding of human/nature relations. The priority 
Warren gives to 'feeling' and experience overcomes the analytical bias that is part of 
Bookchin 's attempt to develop a natural, concrete basis for ethics (an area of study 
largely ignored by Marx) . Naess, like Warren, pushes past Marx 's relative silence and 
Bookchin's analytical bias to explore the uniquely personal aspects of human experience. 
Naess, unlike Marx,incorporates feeling, intuition and belief into his version of a 
modified empirical outlook on human-nature relations. 
--
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CHAPTER 4: NAESS: VALUE AND HUMAN/NATURE RELATIONS 
One of the primary issues in the ecological philosophy of Arne Naess is highlighting 
the place of values in human/nature relationships. His understanding of value is not 
Marxist; it does not rely on historical analysis, dialectical materialism or the labor theory 
of value. Further, the term 'value' is used in its modem sense, having a wider meaning 
for Naess than for Marx, i.e. , encompassing ethical , religious, aesthetic and other types of 
value as well as economic value. Yet despite these major differences, Naess's overall 
approach to value theory echoes themes addressed in the early works of Marx, pivoting 
around the main idea that philosophy must ground itself concretely on the real relations 
between human beings and nature. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that Naess, like Marx, approaches 
philosophy from a modified empirical perspective. Both Naess and Marx modify strict 
empiricism by incorporating the contextual relations within which humans actually exist 
into the founding premises of philosophy. In the attempt to bring human experience into 
empirical debate, Marx focuses on the historical, social and economic context of human 
activity in and experience of the world, while Naess adds to these the immediate personal 
and natural context of the human experience in the world. In addition, it will be demon-
strated that Naess develops a systematic method for understanding human experience, 
one that is based on the incorporation of ethical value into the concrete and dynamic real 
world of human experience. Further, Naess' s claim that his concept of the ethical value 
of nature, like Marx's concept of the labor theory of value (of commodities), arises from 
concrete human interaction with (or experience of) nature and is used to critique 
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contemporary, scientific or other empirical evaluations of the value of nature as grounded 
in an unrealistic (i.e., abstract) view of the human/nature relation. 
Naess extends Marx 's empirical approach to value beyond its narrow, economistic 
application. Naess also appeals to the phenomenological experience of nature to demon-
strate empirically that the human/nature relationship gives rise to the human conception 
of value. Throughout this chapter, parallels to Marx's criticism of empirical methods, 
differences in Marx's and Naess' conceptions of nature, and the centrality ofhu-
man/nature relations in value theory will be noted. 
1. Naess's modified empirical approach to assessing the value of nature - This 
section reviews Marx's conception of the general role of value in social theories that are 
based on historical facts and compares Marx's viewpoint with Naess's conception of the 
general role of value in social policy debates that are based on scientific facts . 
Both Marx and Naess are critical of the traditional empirical and scientific attitude, 
which understands nature as an entity that is isolated from human experience (experience, 
here, is understood to include the human judgments based on the concept of intrinsic 
value.) According to Marx and Naess, nature can only be understood in terms of 
human/nature relations, dynamic relations which encompass human assessments of the 
value of nature. Further, the human recognition of the value of nature does not conflict 
with an empirical, scientific approach to the study of society. Rather, it prompts the 
formulation of social policy and social theory which, while not based on an abstract 
understanding of human experience, nonetheless is more realistic and relevant to social 
analysis than are purely objective, empirical-scientific approaches. 
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To illustrate how Naess justifies his claim that discussion of the ethical value of 
nature can be empirically conducted, consider the following example. Naess claims that 
nearly everyone, upon investigation of their own value priorities, would arrive at the 
conclusion that nature (non-human life forms) has inherent value, independent of human 
needs. In "Intrinsic Value: Will the Defenders of Nature Please Rise,"130 Naess refers to 
his survey of policy experts in Norway (which had a statistically valid sample size of 
110) for empirical evidence supporting this claim: in reaction to the first of eight points 
in the 'deep ecology platform, ' "the great majority indicated their agreement" to these 
two statements: "The flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth has inherent 
value. The value of non-human lifeforms is independent of the usefalness of the 
nonhuman world for human purposes. " 131 According to Naess, the judgments - that a) 
non-human life forms have intrinsic value'" and b) non-human life forms are not merely 
means to a human end - are facts, based on the empirical evidence grounded in the real 
existence of this judgment as a human opinion. Naess further cites the fact that there 
exists no "opposite articulated philosophy" which claims that nature bas no intrinsic 
value. He takes this to support his claim that the statement "non-human life forms have 
intrinsic value" is systematically, philosophically defensible. 133 
130 Published in Wisdom in the Open Air, Edited by Reed, Peter and Rothenberg, David, 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp.70-82. 
131 Ibid., p. 76. 
132 Naess uses the terms 'inherent value' and ' intrinsic value' synonymously. 
133 Ibid., p. 77. Similar arguments are made in Ecology, Community and lifestyle, Op. 
Cit., see pp. 29, 66-67, 87-88 and 176-177. For an argument against Naess's position 
that deep questioning leads to some form of affirmation of the inherent value of 
non-human nature, see Warwick Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, (Boston: 
Shambhala; New York), 1990, Chapter 5. For arguments defending Naess's claim see 
Harold Glasser, "On Warwick Fox's Assessment of Deep Ecology", Environmental 
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Naess' s empirical approach to the study of value, like Marx's approach, demonstrates 
a quantitative analysis of value. In Marx's study of the commodity, the quintessential 
physical manifestation of capitalism, he emphasizes economic value and asserts that the 
value of each commodity is created by labor through the interaction of human and 
non-human nature. The physical embodiment of human value in the commodity allows 
for the empirical study of value: the value of x is the worth of x, measured by price and 
determined by labor (broadly conceived to include the social context of the relevant, 
specific intellectual and physical activities). For Marx, only labor creates value in (or 
gives worth to) nature and things created from natural objects. Therefore, according to 
Marx, value is an economically measurable (and also a historically factual) portion of the 
human "life active process," a process which forms the "naturalist" base for arguments 
involving historical facts. 
Although Naess's approach is an attempt to analyze judgments concerning the 
intrinsic value of nature, and not a measurement of economic value, both Marx and Naess 
claim that their approach is a better description ofreality than those provided by the 
social scientists of their respective times. Naess, like Marx, argues that the presence of 
human activity (specifically the activity of formulating ethical judgments) is crucial to 
socio-economic and socio-political analysis. 
Recall that Marx's method of historical analysis is empiricist, modified by the 
assertion that the first premise of empirical arguments is actual human life in a particular 
natural and socio-historical context. According to Marx, the "active Ii fe process" of 
Ethics, Vol. 19, Spring 1997, pp. 75-82. 
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human interaction with nature must serve as the premise for all empirical social studies 
- otherwise empiricism is not grounded in reality. In this way Marx demands that the 
complexity and fullness of human being (including humanity' s value creating potential) 
be recognized as the basis of a scientific, dialectical-materialist approach (as opposed to 
the both "abstract" idealist or pure empiricist approaches) to philosophy. Thus, in his 
dialogue with historians and political economists (the social policy experts of his day), 
Marx asserts that empirical arguments would be less "abstract" and hence more realistic if 
they incorporated descriptions of the "active life-process" of humanity, within a 
socio-natural context, into their theory. Indirectly, then, Marx includes labor value (and 
thus the intrinsic value of nature as he defines it) in the "real premises" of historical 
analysis. 
Naess makes a similar claim in his dialogue with the scientific advisors to political 
policy makers; although, his appeal for the inclusion of statements concerning the 
intrinsic value of nature into the premises of empirical arguments is a direct one. Naess, 
like Marx, is concerned about introducing an active human life process into social science 
in a non-"idealist" or non-"abstract" way. Also like Marx, he states that the method (or 
"approach") of the empirical science of ecology would be improved if it incorporated 
human activity (in the form of ethical evaluation) into the measurement and assessment 
of facts. 134 
134 Naess is not rejecting Marx's demand that social analysis include economic class and 
power relations. Rather, Naess is claiming that ethical values underlie assumptions about 
the 'goodness' of various social policies (such as a policy in favor of an equitable 
distribution of wealth). See Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, p. 105. 
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Chemistry, physics, and the science of ecology acknowledge only change, not valued 
change. But you and I would presumably agree that a change in the bio-conditions of a 
river or ocean which excluded most forms of life would constitute a deterioration of 
value .... The inability of science to denounce such processes as the washing away of the 
soil of rain-forests suggests that we need another approach which involves the 
inescapable role of announcing values, not only 'facts'. 135 
An analysis of the context of the above quote demonstrates that the "values" Naess 
wants scientists to announce are ethical values, not economic ones. For Naess, the value 
of x is not merely a question of the worth of x, but rather a question of the good of x. 
Naess appeals to common sense to support his claim: "you and I presumably agree that a 
change in the bio-conditions ofa river ... constitute[s] a deterioration of value." By 
' deterioration,' most people mean a "change for the worse, a decrease in value."136 Fur-
thermore, he claims that the judgment that this change in value is 'bad' presupposes an 
ethics. "An ethical theory is presupposed, a system which allows one to judge a change 
as negative." 137 Therefore, by "denouncing" or praising a change in the "bio-condition of 
a river," scientists would be adding their ethical evaluation of the "facts" instead of 
merely presenting "factual" information. Just as Marx appeals to social thinkers to 
include the dynamic human activity oflabor in the analysis ofotherwise "dead facts" 
(Marx's phrase), Naess appeals to the ecological scientists who are public policy advisors 
1
" Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, Op. Cit., p. 24. 
136 Ibid., p. 23. 
137 Ibid., p. 23. An ethics with regard to non-human nature is also presupposed in 
Marx ' s pejorative description of man's historically "necessary" abuse of nature, women 
and other men. For example: "It is necessary that this appearance be abolished - that 
landed property, the root of private property, be dragged completely in the movement of 
private property ... that the marriage of convenience should take the place of the marriage 
of honour with the land; and that the land should likewise sink to the status of a 
commercial value, like man. It is essential that that which is the root of landed property 
- filthy self-interest - make its appearance, too, in its cynical form ." Marx, Marx 
Engels Collected Works, Vol 3., p. 267. 
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to include the dynamic human activity of ethical evaluation to their othetwise neutral or 
"shallow" analyses of change. He does not criticize scientific methods per se, but, like 
Marx, Naess demands that we rethink what a " fact" is. 
Naess defines deep ecology in terms of an ethical "approach" to nature in which 
scientific facts about nature, like the economic facts of society, are not understood in 
isolation from the conscious, human active experience of the socio-natural world. 
The essence of deep ecology - as compared with the science 
of ecology, and with what I call the shallow ecological movement 
- is to ask deeper questions. The adjective "deep" stresses that 
we ask why and how, where others do not. For instance, ecology 
as a science does not ask what kind of society would be the best for 
maintaining a particular ecosystem - that is considered a question 
for value theory, for politics, for ethics. As long as ecologists keep 
narrowly to their science, they do not ask such questions."' 
Marx, like contemporary practitioners of ' shallow ecology,' did not explicitly 
recognize his ethical system as a premise in his empirical arguments. It has been 
demonstrated that Naess extends Marx 's empirical approach to value into the realm of 
ethics. Yet, it should be noted that Marx did explore non-economic value. He addresses 
philosophical questions concerning the ethical value or worth of the commodity system. 
From his depiction of"oppressed" workers, "greedy" capitalists, and the dialectical path 
of historical progress toward socio-natural harmony, Marx clearly states his ethical 
position: commodity production is bad for the workers, is good for the capitalists and is a 
historically necessary evil which will yield to the good for society as a whole. Marx 's 
ethical assumptions about what is good and what is bad do not enter explicitly into the 
premises of his entire philosophical argument, although they implicitly influenced his 
138 Naess, Arne, "Simple in Means, Rich in Ends," Op. Cit., p. 183. 
76 
entire philosophy. Naess claims that ethical assumptions are at the base of philosophy 
and that this claim is not based on idealist or rel igious notions, but rather is based on 
scientific premises. "' 
Like Marx, Naess is concerned with demonstrating the empirical validity of his 
method, a method of deep questioning and of announcing one's ethical evaluations of 
ecological social policies. By his appeal to common sense, Naess claims to have 
demonstrated that ethical "value priorities" underlie various arguments in support of, or 
in opposition to, various social policies. However, Naess argues that appeals to common 
sense do not, and cannot, stand alone as a method for investigating one's ethical 
assumptions. Rigorous logical analysis is required. He also draws a parallel from 
mathematical and scientific arguments to show that it is valid for empirically unsupported 
claims, such as ethical claims, to serve as the foundation for logically consistent argu-
ments. If ethical theory, he reasons, as well as the values from which ethical theory is 
derived, is presupposed in fact-based arguments which include statements of "valued" 
change, then values and ethical theory are premises in these arguments. Therefore, 
uncovering these values, Naess argues, reveals a priori premises, a class of premises 
which is at the basis of all empirical chains of argument. 
139 Bookchin, intolerant of any position that does not affirm his historical-dialectical 
view of the world, vigorously disagrees with Naess's position. "To declare, as Ame 
Naess, the pontiff of 'deep ecology,' has done, that the 'basic principles of the deep 
ecology movement lie in religion or philosophy,' is to make a conclusion notable for its 
absence ofreference to social theory." Bookchin, Murray, "Why This Book Was 
Written," Remaking Society, Op. Cit. , p. 12. Bookchin's criticism ofNaess (although not 
of all 'deep ecologists' ) is, I think, erroneous. Further, unlike Naess, Bookchin regards 
ethical sensibility, although historically prior to and necessary for the evolution of 
abstract consciousness, as an unacceptable (non-empirical) premise for analytical 
argument. 
--
77 
Not everything can be proven - an old thought first emphasised by Aristotle. The string 
of proofs on any definite occasion must commence somewhere. . .. History of 
mathematics and logic shows a diversity of systems, but they all have rules, some 
deduced from other rules, but at least one must be simply postulated, without any 
j us ti fication whatsoever. 140 
Naess applies the logic of mathematical systems and logical systems to value theory, 
arriving at the conclusion that value statements, such as "the flourishing of human and 
non-human Ii fe on Earth has inherent value," can serve as the basis for a logically 
derived, empirical argument. 
2. Value as Based in Concrete Nature - As demonstrated, both Naess and Marx 
claim that value is an empirical reality, inasmuch as they insist that the inclusion of a 
social 'value' perspective adds substance to scientific and social-scientific 'factual' 
knowledge claims. However, unlike Marx's conception of the activity of labor, Naess ' s 
understanding of the activities of ethical evaluation and "deep" questioning"' are not 
grounded in human behavior which creates value. Rather, such human activities lead to 
value judgment concerning the particular human relation to specific, concrete qualities in 
nature (or rather the entire human and non-human world). This section examines Naess's 
140 Naess, Ame, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, Op. Cit., p. 68. 
141 The social, political, philosophical implications of human value judgments are an 
important aspect of the reality which Naess attempts to bring into discussions of 'the facts 
of the matter ' with regard to scientific ecological data. Scientific knowledge, in its use by 
human society, is political and social. The term "question" in English is an inexact 
translation ofNaess' intent: "But defining the movements [Deep and Shallow ecology] in 
terms of deepness of questioning is misleading. 
The English term questioning is not as forceful as the German and French 
equivalents : prob/ematizieren, Problematizierung, problematique, etc. In European 
philosophy and politics during the late '60s these terms were important - the whole 
industrial society was questioned: problematiziert." Naess, "Deepness of Questions and 
the Deep Ecology Movement," Deep Ecology for the 21st Century, Edited by George 
Sessions, p. 210. 
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understanding of the human process of comprehending value as an external human/nature 
relation. 
Naess turns to a study of the human process of understanding nature to demonstrate 
empirically that the human/nature relationship gives rise to the human conception of 
value. Naess claims that assessments of the value of nature are based on concretely real 
qualities that exist in nature and that are phenomenologically experienced by humans. 
Marx, by comparison, claims that assessments of the value of nature are based on 
intrinsic value of the labor that is added to nature and on the instrumental value of the real 
qualities that exist in nature. Rather than emphasizing particular labor processes which 
drive historical changes in human/nature relations and in the social value of nature, as 
Marx does, Naess analyzes the phenomenological process of particular human 
experiences of nature to demonstrate the concrete basis of value judgments, which are 
formed from the concreteness of qualities in nature and the relationship which this 
'qualitied' nature has with the human perceiver/experiencer. 
At the base ofNaess's understanding of the concrete qualities of nature is a challenge 
to the dualist distinction between 'fact' and 'value.' Naess rejects the notion that what is 
' good' is subjective and what is ' empirically true' is objective, introducing instead the 
concept ofrelationality. Naess argues that "If the term 'objectivity' is meant to imply 
certainty, intersubjectivity, and stability, scientific texts gain in objectivity when 
evaluations used as premises are explicitly formulated."' " 
Some may have received the impression that I have basically concluded 
that everything is subjective, and that our original distinction 
142 Naess, Ame, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, Op. Cit., p. 40. 
--
subjective/objective useless. (sic) This impression should be dispelled if 
one keeps the following in mind: there is a difference between something 
relational and something which is no more than an expression of one 
person's personal judgement. When we say 'the Eiffel Tower is on the 
left', we describe a state of affairs which does not express individual 
person judgement. 143 
According to Naess, a discussion of personal values in the context of social policy 
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based on scientifically measurable facts introduces the addition of "knowledge" which is 
not physically objective the way the number of trees affected by a particular blight may 
be counted. However, such discussion adds to our knowledge of the facts by contextual-
izing the discussion as a social state of affairs. By adding an assessment of the particular 
human/nature relationship under discussion, the context of the "subjective" impression 
can be understood as an empirically "objective" one. 
Naess asserts that particular values (such as the beauty of a landscape orthe goodness 
of a ripe tomato or the preciousness of a human life) and opinions of the intrinsic or 
instrumental worth of any object emerge from real, concrete qualities in nature through 
their particular relation to the valuing human subject. For Naess, the relation has an 
abstract, yet real existence. 
Between the items of the world conceived as contents in the 
fonns of gestalts there are internal structural relations, but they do 
not add to the set of contents. As we are free to conceptualise them 
in different ways . . . . The importance of abstract structural 
considerations cannot be overestimated, but, like maps, their 
function is not to add to the territory, the contents, but to make it 
more visible. The whole Earth is not the Earth plus its maps.144 
143 Ibid., pp. 49-50. 
144 Ibid., p. 67. 
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This parallels Marx ' s demonstration that all economic value is an abstract conception, 
although based on real quantities of labor and materials in particular relation of their use 
value in the social marketplace. Both Naess and Marx conceive of value as emerging 
from the process of the human experience of the world. However, Naess's understanding 
of value "objectivity" (in the sense of certainty and intersubjectivity) encompasses ethical 
value, while Marx 's investigation of economic value avoids the investigation of ethical 
value (perhaps as he could not conceive of how to avoid basing ethics on what he 
considered "speculative" foundations). 
Naess argues that without the conscious participation of human beings in the 
experience of concrete qualities, the very conception of the value of nature is senseless.'" 
He describes the conscious process of the spontaneous experience of nature as one that is 
the basis for recognition of value in nature. He relies on phenomenological arguments to 
describe this experience as a non-judgmental openness to nature, an involvement in the 
world without "deliberately focused" '" perception. "Phenomenological viewpoints are 
valuable for the development of consciousness of a non-instrumental, non-utilitarian 
content of the immediate experience of nature. " 147 
Naess ' s arguments concerning openness to nature reveal a key difference between 
Marx and Naess . For Naess, particular phenomenological experiences, and not particular 
activities of labor, establish the value of nature. Naess describes the process of the 'open 
consciousness' as gestalt thinking in which the concrete and intangible qualities - in 
145 Naess, Is It Painful To Think?, p. 9. 
146 Naess, Arne, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, Op. Cit., p. 60. 
147 Ibid. , p. 51. 
---
combination - comprise reality. A non-self-conscious or 'open' experience of our 
surroundings reveals that values are part of the concrete phenomena comprising the 
individual gestalt experience. The immediate experience when one is absorbed in the 
world is one of apperception. 
When one's attention is not deliberately focused upon per-
ceptual gestalts, all experience is apperceptive. Its units are 
appercepti ve gestalts, not sensory elements, not intellectual 
elements. The distinction between 'facts' and 'values ' only 
emerges from gestalts through the activity of abstract thinking. 
The distinction is useful, but not when the intention is to describe 
the immediate world in which we live, the world of gestalts, the 
living reality, the only reality known to us. 148 
So for Naess, values arise from concrete qualities that are apperceived in the open 
experience of the world. As value necessarily involves both the valuer and the valued, 
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values are neither objective nor subjective, but emerge in the human relation to the world 
from the qualities of the phenomenal world. 
Further, in order to argue that characteristics, yielding values within the context of 
human relations, are embedded in the concrete contents of the world, Naess rejects the 
modem philosophic concept of the thing in itself, which is based in the "strong 
philosophical tradition [that] goes from Newton to Kant."149 Instead he argues that by 
reducing the 'objectivity' of things to a set of abstract qualities common for all observers, 
the 'thing' gets stripped of its specific size, shape, color, taste, beauty and the complex of 
qualities which generates impressions such as the beautiful, dreary or pathetic.150 Naess 
148 Ibid., p. 60. 
149 Ibid., p. 48. 
"
0 Naess argues that modem philosophy relegates all but the primary qualities of nature 
as "objective," whereas Naess includes the qualities of felt experience in the description 
of concrete reality. See Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, pp. 51 - 54. 
claims that the resultant abstract description bears no resemblance to the 'thing' in 
question. The unique and particular set of qualities that defines a thing in the natural 
world is denied. 
A good deal is common for all dogs, but the attempt to imagine a 
dog which has the common, and only the common features of all 
dogs overlooks not only colour but everything which distinguishes 
a bulldog from a terrier. A nature consisting solely of the features 
about which we are continuously in agreement is like such a 
spectral dog - therefore any objective notion of nature cannot be 
seen as that which we all agree upon as being 'there.' 151 
Naess asserts that when we are involved in the observation of other objects, 'we' 
seem to disappear and the 'other' (a worm, a river, whatever) is valuable in that it 
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possesses specific, concretely 'there' qualities, such as a striving for life, an order, beauty, 
strength, grace, etc. 152 Through these concretely 'there' qualities, the value of concrete 
nature is real. It is based on given concrete complexes of independently existing qualities 
which are experienced. Thus, it can be concluded that Naess's rejection of the abstract 
modem approach is one that is grounded in the ordinary human experience of the 
physical contents of the world - what "we all agree upon as being 'there."' Recall that 
Marx added human experience (in the form of specific and concretely real labor) to his 
understanding of the reality of the thing-itself, thus also rejecting the in-itself and 
for-itself distinction. The quality of labor, which when embodied in a thing gives it 
15 1 !bid., p. 49. 
152 Bookchin's definition of sensibility (the basis for moral value and organic process 
thinking in social ecology) also requires that the actual experiencing of moral values 
involves a certain 'openness ' to the world in which we are situated: "such an ethic retains 
its openness to the richness of human sensibility as the embodiment of sensibility itself at 
all levels of organic and social evolution." Bookchin, Ecology of Freedom, Op. Cit., p. 
353. 
83 
value, is really 'there' in the thing and serves as the basis for abstraction. For Naess, 
these qualities which we perceive as valuable exist in nature and are discovered through 
the human experience of nature, while for Marx, the qualities which we perceive as 
valuable exist in nature by virtue of human activity. Despite these differences, it can be 
concluded that both Naess and Marx reject the modem view of the thing-itself. 
Recall that Marx, like Naess, posits intrinsic value as a characteristic of the concrete 
world, although indirectly through labor. Marx also combines instrumental and intrinsic 
value, conceiving of instrumental value as the intrinsic value of labor embedded in a 
natural/material, useful object. ln the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx asserts that the instrumen-
tal value of nature exists to the extent that nature has been self-consciously acted upon as 
a means to a human end, while its intrinsic value implicitly exists: Human beings are 
intrinsically valuable, and they are part of nature. By extension, we can say that nature is 
also intrinsically valuable insofar as it is self-consciously acted upon by human beings. 
Thus Marx values the humanity that he discerns in non-human nature, yet maintains the 
distinction between instrumental value and intrinsic value. In contrast, Naess collapse the 
distinction, conceiving of the intrinsic/instrumental value distinction as part of a dualist 
division separating value from the valued and the valuer, hence denying the basic 
relationality of value. Naess defends his claim of the concreteness of value by 
demonstrating how the concrete experience of nature gives rise to the pre-theoretic 
perception of value. 
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Conclusion: In conclusion, it can be stated that Naess, using the contemporary 
language of"systems and relational perspectives,"'" and Marx, using the language of 
dialectics, both conceive of value theory in terms of an interactive relation between the 
individual, life-experiencing human and the socio-natural world. In examining Naess' 
conception of the value of nature, it can be stated that Marx's "naturalist" method and 
critique of strict empiricism is echoed by Naess. Both philosophers provide a detailed 
analysis, based on concrete examples drawn from human experience, to demonstrate the 
relationship between concrete reality and the abstract reality of perceptions of value. 
Although they differ in which abstract values are added, for Marx it is labor and for 
Naess it is ethics, they are kindred in approaching philosophy as a living or modified 
empiricism. 
"' Naess, Ame, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, Op. Cit., p. 36. 
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CONCLUSION 
The naturalist-humanist foundation of Marx ' s philosophy is the result of his effort to 
base philosophy on the human experience of human/nature unity, a unity which 
incorporates consciousness, social relations and value theory into an understanding of the 
natural world . Marx ' s realism and his tum to human/nature relations as the founding 
premises of philosophy form an approach to philosophy that is recapitulated by 
Bookchin, Warren and Naess - each of whom furthers Marx's work. Each continues the 
process of removing "idealist" premises from philosophy and probes the human/nature 
relation to understand the meaning of human consciousness in its analytical and ethical 
aspects. 
It has been demonstrated that Marx's philosophical framework and approach to the 
issue of human-nature relations has proved to be a source of ideas and direction for those 
philosophers faced with the task of expressing a new kind of human-nature relationship. 
Marx's shift away from traditional idealism and materialism has served as a guide to 
Bookchin, as shown by Bookchin ' s direct adaptation of Marx's dialectical-historical 
approach both to the progress of human/nature relations and to structuring the problem of 
the origins of human consciousness in nature. In Warren's case, it has been demonstrated 
that the theoretical foundat ions of ecofeminism rely heavily on Marxist and socialist 
traditions and that the feminist pluralist components of ecofeminism can be understood as 
an extension of Marx ' s emphasis on the particular context of human socio-historical 
reality. Arne Naess, whose methods of philosophy bear the least resemblance to those of 
Marx, is nevertheless pre-occupied with a problem that was of central concern to Marx: 
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the inclusion of the human assessment of the value of nature into the analysis of 
human/nature relations and social reality. 
While the metaphysical shift from idealism to dialectical materialism led by Marx 
serves as a guide to Bookchin, Warren and Naess, Marx 's own view of nature and nature 
relations has been modified or in some instance superseded by these ecological 
philosophers for a variety ofreasons discussed throughout this thesis. Despite differences 
of approach to both ecological philosophy and the Marxist heritage, Bookchin, Warren 
and Naess agree on the reality of the interrelatedness of the human and non-human 
aspects of nature and on the social necessity of recognizing nature as more than of 
instrumental value to humanity. All four thinkers unanimously regard as a problem the 
lack of recognition given to human needs and values as part of economic 
decision-making; such neglect leads in their view to disastrous social policy - with 
disastrous ecological consequences as well. 
While Marx's philosophy serves as a model for Bookchin, Warren and Naess, his 
work does not reflect a genuine and non-theoretical concern for non-human nature. It is 
the task of contemporary social/ecological philosophers to incorporate Marx's critique of 
socio-economic problems within the larger framework of a social-natural environment. 
It is hoped that clarifying the relationship between human and non-human nature as 
understood by Karl Marx, and comparing his views to three different thinkers with 
respect to the concept of human consciousness in relation to intrinsic value, will prompt 
further comparisons on topics such as the impact of human/nature relations on the 
concept of human identity, social action and the politics of environmentalism. 
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APPENDIX 
German philosopher Karl Marx ( 1818-1883) is commonly regarded as the father of 
modem communism or scientific socialism. The posthumous discovery of the 1884 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and the German Ideology, and their publication 
in 1927 and 1932, respectively, provided the opportunity for a renewed look at Marx's 
thought. These works can be understood as supporting the interpretation of Marx as 
opposed to all forms of idealism -- even communist idealism -- as the foundation for 
political action and philosophic theory. 
American philosopher Murray Bookchin has written extensively over the last forty 
years on anarchistic, utopian and environmental philosophy. Dominant themes include 
freedom, naturalism and material dialectics. Bookchin cofounded the Institute for Social 
Ecology (lSE), based in Plainfield, Vermont. He is the Director Emeritus of!SE and 
Professor Emeritus at Ramapo College in New Jersey. 
Karen J. Warren is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Macalester College, St. 
Paul, Minnesota. Her teaching and research focus on ecofeminism and environmental 
ethics. She has published articles in various philosophy journals since 1987. Recently 
she has co-edited two books, Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature and Bringing Peace 
Home. She is the editor of"Ecological Feminist Philosophies." 
Norwegian philosopher and world-class mountain climber Arne Naess established a 
reputation as a thinker among members of the Vienna circle in the mid-1930's. Earning a 
doctorate with a thesis on positivism, Naess taught in and for many years chaired the 
philosophy department at the University of Oslo, Norway from 1936 through 1970. His 
work on the pluralism of meanings earned him a commission by UNESCO in 1949 to 
define 'democracy.' He is active in the 'deep ecology' movement, and his remains active 
at the university through the Centre for Development and the Environment. 
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